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This thesis tests the proposition that politicians are a potential source of economic fluctuations 
in Nigeria. As a result, underlying assumptions of existing political cycle theories are relaxed 
to test politically-determined cycles in a context where elections do not hold and where 
politicians’ ideology are neither left nor right but are influenced by other institutional features 
peculiar to Nigeria’s political structure.  The results obtained from the study provide empirical 
support for the existence of political business cycles in Nigeria. In a novel manner, the study 
extends the political cycle literature by investigating the cyclical features of political cycles, 
using a dynamic factor model that extracts a one-step ahead political shock component. Result 
shows that shocks from political activities are only a small proportion of aggregate economic 
















1.1 Background to the Study 
Since the 1930s, era of the Great Depression, one primary concern of macroeconomists and 
policy makers has been, inquiring into the sources, nature and effects of macroeconomic 
fluctuations. Following growing research interest on economic fluctuations- defined as the 
periodic expansion and contraction in aggregate economic activity- the underlying sources of 
economic shocks identified were: the demand or supply shocks and the nominal or real shocks. 
By nature, these sources clearly typified the field of business cycles into different schools of 
thought. Also, for a long while, research on the phenomena ‘economic fluctuations or business 
cycles’ continued to be limited to developed economies only. 
Following the markedly episodes of macroeconomic instability in the post war era, inquiry 
about business cycles in developed economies, became pertinent on two grounds. First, its 
occurrence was highly likely to impose costs on the economy, as recessions implied lost income 
and decline in society’s welfare. The other reason was purely intellectual. Economic 
fluctuations or business cycles provided yet another field of intense scholarly learning, with its 
fascinating characteristics of boom and bust (    ) 
However, since the Great Moderation period-characterised by relative stability in the 1970s- it 
is noteworthy that research on business cycle has diminished along the scale of preference of 
several scholars in developed economies. Paradoxically, in the case of developing countries, it 





Little, Cooper, Corden and Rajapatirana (1993, paraphrased) showed that: 
“Until the 1970s, research on developing countries was 
mainly concerned with longer run structural issues. However, with 
the harsh economic shocks of the 1980s and the ensuing debt crises 
in countries throughout the world, attention turned increasingly to 
macroeconomic policy and thus, to economic fluctuations...” 
Up until now, inquiry into the sources and nature of economic fluctuations in developing 
countries, remain germane. This is stemming from the fact that these countries have more 
volatile economies than industrialized economies. The first reason for the high volatility is that 
developing countries experience frequent ‘incoherent’ swings in major economic outcomes. 
Another reason for the high volatility in developing economies relative developed ones, stems 
from the presence of an unstable development process, coupled with self-inflicted policy 
mistakes (World Bank, 2008).  




The figure above shows comparative economic volatility over the period 1960-2010. With 
reference to the second and third bars, economic fluctuation is confirmed to be more 
pronounced in developing (LDCs) than developed countries. 
Despite that economic variability with its attendant cost, poses a major concern to developing 
countries, it is seen that sparse literature in this area exist. This realisation becomes more 
evident in case studies on Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). For example while writing on business 
cycle fluctuations in Nigeria, Alege (2008) identified the dearth of business cycle literature in 
SSA and Nigeria. 
Transiting to the core issue of economic fluctuations, one may observe that economic shocks 
in developing economies are attributed to either domestic or external factors. For example, the 
small size of many of these economies renders them vulnerable to external shocks. On the other 
hand, the World Bank notes that an unstable development process, coupled with self-inflicted 
policy mistakes are also major sources of shocks in developing countries. Thus, in this study, 
of the two sources of shocks- domestic and external- in developing countries, the domestic 
sources of economic shocks are emphasised. 
Upon realisation of the importance of domestic sources of shocks and its attendant economic 
costs, one finds that policy makers in less developed countries are faced with proposing 
measures to mitigate the magnitude and effects of these shocks. For example, in a bid to combat 
the economic fluctuations in Nigeria, a core objective of the Nigerian Vision 2020 is 
engendering macroeconomic stability.  
Conversely, this work argues that even though economic fluctuations is one pervasive 
phenomenon that policymakers in developing economies seek to curtail. It happens that by 
outright policy mistakes and vested self-interest, politicians/policymakers can be a source of 
economic fluctuations. This is particularly likely in a poorly-developed political environment, 
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where politicians face little or no constraints on their decision making power (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, Robinson & Thiaicharoen, 2002). With little or no constrain on decision making 
power, binding rules that constrain politicians from adopting self-seeking economic policies 
are missing. Once missing, politicians are incentivised to change economic policies at will, 
such that every new government in power discontinues with his predecessor’s policies (Little 
et al, 1993). Then, it happens that through frequent changes in policies, economic fluctuations 
are likely to be induced.  
However, as important as policymakers/ politicians are to potentially inducing, exacerbating 
and/or steadying macroeconomic variability, it was not until the 1970s, with the works of 
Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977), that this phenomenon -that politicians might be potential 
sources of economic fluctuations- became formalized. This phenomenon ‘political business 
cycle’, puts forward that an economy shifts or fluctuates as power is transferred from President 
to President (Bloomberg and Hess, 2000). 
While the central argument of Nordhaus (1975) was that an economy cycles because an 
opportunist incumbent wishing to be re-elected implements expansionary economic policies 
before elections, so as to woo voters and contraction policies after; Hibbs’ (1977) idea was that 
politicians possessing different ideologies and macroeconomic objectives are the impulse to 
economic fluctuations. 
In the case of Less Developed Countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, the large presence of 
government as reflected in government spending as a proportion of GDP presents the continent 
as a fertile case study of the political cycle phenomena central to this work. For example, 
Nigeria is a fertile case study for the study of political cycles, as she possesses an active 
government (%). Another reason is that the discretion afforded to incumbents in many sub-
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Saharan African countries makes this part of the world a particularly good place to test 
hypotheses about... political business cycles (Block, Feree and Singh, 2003) 
1.2 Statement of Research Problems 
Indeed, from the preceding paragraph, Sub-Saharan Africa economies present a veritable case 
for the study of the existence of political cycles. However, existing political business cycle 
theories that can be used to study politically-induced fluctuations might not be readily 
applicable to developing countries. This is because these theories are grounded in stylized 
democratic political structures typical of developed countries only.  
Democratic political structures in developed countries differ from those obtainable in less 
developed countries on the grounds that they are embedded in strong political institutions 
where the rule of law holds and transparency pervades with checks and balances that make it 
difficult for politicians to manipulate existing political economic structures. Conversely, the 
nascent democracies of developing countries characterised by weak institutions presents 
incentives that encourage politicians to engage in manipulative political activities.  
Therefore, as to the weak institutional structures in developing countries, existing political 
cycle models may fail to account for economic fluctuations if some underlying assumptions of 
these theories are not relaxed. Despite this, the application of Political business cycles theories 
to developing countries show that on the contrary, political cycles are more pronounced in 
developing countries than in developed countries ((Schuknecht (1996); Gonzalez (2002); 
Svensson and Shi (2000) as cited from (Drazen, 2000b)). For these authors, varying factors 
such as access to economic rents, lack of transparency are among the several reasons for the 
surprising presence of political cycles in developing countries. 
Furthermore, upon reviewing the application of existing political business cycle models to 
authoritarian regimes, it is discovered that existing models have not been applied to societies 
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where elections do not hold. A glaring reason is that present political business cycle theories 
are based on the notion that elections are held. Therefore, can political business cycles-in the 
sense that the economy cycles as leaders change -exist in countries where elections do not hold?  
The above question becomes important in light of applying PBCs theories to the Nigerian 
economy. Since 1960, Nigeria has had 14 political regimes, of which 8 are military while only 
6 are democracies. Therefore, Nigeria’s political history serves a fascinating case to political 
cycle literature on the grounds that the country has had both authoritarian regimes where 
elections did not hold and at present, possesses a nascent democracy. 
Then, the first research gap of this study is applying PBCs theories to Nigeria with a mix of 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. To the best of the author’s knowledge, few or no study 
has investigated the existence of political cycles in a mix of authoritarian and democratic 
regimes. For illustration, the author finds Tarawalie, Ahortor, Adenekan and Comte (undated) 
as the only existing political cycle study on Nigeria. Tarawalie et al (undated) tests for evidence 
of political business cycles in Nigeria using annual data on real GDP growth, inflation rate, 
government expenditure, money growth and money-GDP ratio, over the period 1999 to 2007; 
and find empirical support for political cycle. Albeit, this study differs from Tarawalie et al 
(undated) on grounds that a longer time frame is used (capturing both democratic and military 
regimes), as 1999 to 2007 (only democratic regimes) presents a short time frame to make any 
meaningful statistical conclusion. 
The second research gap to be addressed is characterizing the dynamic properties of political 
cycles. Some underlying benefits of characterising these politically-induced fluctuations are: 
First, to establish stylized facts; then, to create solid empirical basis on which policy 
recommendations can be made. Finally, one can quantify the impact of political shocks on 
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Nigeria’s macro economy. To the best of author’s knowledge no study has explained the 
cyclical properties of political cycle.  
Therefore this study aims to address the identified research gaps, using the appropriate research 
questions, objectives and strategies. 
1.3 Scope of the Study 
This study explores the possibility that Political business cycles are applicable to a mix of 
nascent democracy and authoritarian regimes (with no elections). Asides the intellectual 
purpose of this work, a mix of democracy and authoritarian regimes is being studied to provide 
econometrically adequate sample size. This is because of the 13 political regimes in Nigeria, 8 
are authoritarian and 5 democratic. Analysing only 5 democratic regimes provides a small 
sample size on which no meaningful generalisations can be made 
Moreover, this work tests the existence and examines the nature of political cycles in Nigeria 
for the period 1960-2010. This study period is selected since it captures the various political 
regimes (both authoritarian and democratic) in post-colonial Nigeria.  
1.4 Research Questions 
With reference to the above stated research problem and in order to examine economic 
fluctuations as induced by successive political regimes (autocratic and democratic) in Nigeria, 
this study seeks to answer the following: 
1. What evidence of political cycle exists in Nigeria? Such that as political power changes 
from one person (regime) to another, the economy fluctuates? 
 
2. What are the statistical properties of the political cycles derived from question 1? 
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1.5 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to examine politically-induced fluctuations in the context 
that changes in government over time has induced economic fluctuations in the Nigerian 
economy. Therefore, the specific objectives to be examined in this work are: 
1. To test for the existence of political cycles in Nigeria 
2. To characterize the business cycle nature of political cycles in Nigeria 
1.6 Research Hypothesis  
Using relevant empirical data, the research hypothesis to be tested in this study include: 
1. 0 :H  No Politically-induced fluctuation exist in the Nigerian economy between 1960 
and 2010 
1 :H  Politically-induced fluctuations exist in the Nigerian economy between 1960 and 
2010. 
1.7 Significance of Study 
The study of the effect of political regimes on economic fluctuations in developing economies 
and in particular, Nigeria is considered germane on three grounds. First it presents the 
opportunity to contribute to the relatively unexplored territory of Political business cycle 
studies on Nigeria. To the best of the author’s knowledge, Tarawalie et al (undated) remains 
the only country-specific study on Nigeria. 
Secondly, the study is relevant in validating the political cycle theory and in establishing 
cyclical patterns of politically-determined economic outcomes. This is for the purpose of 
establishing stylized facts on the political economy of Nigeria.  
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On the policy making front, results from this study holds implication for objectively rating the 
impact of government varying macroeconomic policies on Nigeria’s economy in the short run, 
for the observed study period. In another vein, the study also holds implication for quantifying 
the contribution of political shocks to aggregate economic fluctuations in Nigeria 
1.8 Research Methods 
To answer the research questions in this study, the research method to be used is mapped as: 
1. The study will employ and adapt existing political business cycle model to Nigeria. In 
effect, existing theories are to be used to test a combination of military and civilian 
regimes. To successfully achieve this, certain assumption of existing theories are likely 
to be relaxed and new assumptions taken. 
 
2. Once the appropriate model has been put in place, atheoretical estimation methods will 
be used to test the existence of political cycles for the peculiar case of Nigeria. The 
Univariate ARMAX model, typifying the Box-Tiao Intervention analysis will be used. 
Furthermore, a Multivariate, dynamic factor technique will also be employed. In both 
techniques, macroeconomic variables are to be regressed on lagged macroeconomic 
variable and political dummies. 
 
Once political cycle have been detected, it is necessary to analyze the behavior of 
economic fluctuations found. The Multivariate technique provides an avenue to 






1.9 Organisation of the Study 
For analytical purposes, this work has been divided into six chapters. Chapter one introduces 
the subject matter, in it the research problem is defined, questions of the thesis and strategies 
to answering these questions are introduced.  Chapter two reviews the political cycle literature. 
In this chapter, theoretical, methodological and empirical reviews are presented; research gaps 
stemming from literature are also identified. In chapter three, some stylized facts on the 
interaction between politics and economic fluctuations are illustrated, both globally and for 
Nigeria. The study’s theoretical framework and methodology makes up chapter four, while the 
estimation results are presented in Chapter five and finally, conclusions, policy implication of 














1.10   Definition of Key terms 
1. Political Regime:  
Fishman (1990) as cited by Ploberger (2012) defines political regimes as the formal or informal 
organisations at the centre of political power determining who has access to political power. 
It can also be regarded as form of government or political institution inherent in a society. In 
this study, political regime is primarily defined as the individual head of government per time. 
For instance, if Persons A and B are heads of government in different period, then the period 
in which A was head of government is referred as A’s regime. In the same vein, the period 
Person B was head of government is referred as B’s regime 
2. Economic Fluctuations: 
It is the periodic expansion (growth) and contraction (recession) in aggregate economic activity 
and other relevant macroeconomic variables, around a long-term growth trend. Other related 
words are business cycles. 
a. Economic Shock: Is an unpredictable and unexpected event that spurs economic 
fluctuations (negative/positive) 










This Chapter provides a comprehensive outline of developments in the political business cycle 
literature. It is divided into main three sections: Theoretical, Methodological and Empirical. 
Nevertheless, for conciseness, the review centres on the first objective of the study: existence 
of political cycle. In the theoretical review, main theories of political business cycle are 
outlined and critiqued. In the methodological review, techniques used to estimate and detect 
political cycles are mentioned and finally, several empirical findings are enumerated in the 
empirical review. 
Then, the chapter is divided into five sections. Apart from section 2.1, in section two, three and 
four, the theoretical, methodological and empirical reviews are presented. Concluding remarks 
are made in section five. 
2.2 Theoretical Review of the Literature 
Political business cycle is the phenomena that politicians by their actions, induce economic 
fluctuations, for the purpose of re-election or because they possess differing ideologies. By this 
definition, theories of politically-induced fluctuations are: (1.) The opportunistic cycle; (2.) 
The partisan cycle.  
The works of Kalecki (1943) and Downs (1957) are believed to have provided the 
philosophical base on which the two strands of political business cycle theories stand. In his 
paper ‘Political Aspects of Full employment’, Kalecki (1943) expounded how and why 
business class individuals oppose full-employment policy measures, as proposed by 
government. According to Kalecki, The business class individuals object to full-employment, 
even though it is economically beneficial to both the business class and working class 
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individuals, due to political reasons. These reasons include the case where entrepreneurs are 
wary of socio-economic order changes, because they believe it makes workers ‘get out of 
hand’. Another reason for opposing government’s full employment policy is because it leads 
to inflationary trends which erode political rentiers. As a result of the implication of full 
employment policies to their self-interests, politicians and big businesses pressure an 
incumbent to take up austere measures. Consequently, by the time the austere measure slides 
the economy into a recession, government is bound to implement full-employment policies to 
combat resulting recession. Therefore, the alternation between austere measures (pressure from 
big businesses) and full employment policies induce economic fluctuations. 
From another angle, Anthony Downs (1957) in ‘An Economic Theory of Democracy’ posited 
that politicians and political parties alike, propose economic policies to win elections, not win 
elections to implement policies. As a result, Downs formalised the Median Voters Theorem 
which depicts that in a two-party system, irrespective of the original divergences of political 
ideologies, the policies of political parties tend to converge, such that both parties in the two-
party system pursue the same policy when in office (Alesina, 1988; paraphrased). 
Stemming from these philosophical bases, Nordhaus (1975) formalised the idea that politicians 
induce economic fluctuations, in his opportunistic political cycle. The opportunistic cycle 
explains economic fluctuations as originating from the re-election motive of an incumbent 
politician. In order to maximise his chances of re-election, an incumbent politician is pressured 
to ‘manipulate’ policies by implementing expansionary policy-reduce unemployment-prior to 
election and then austere policy measures, after elections. 
In a different dimension, the idea that parties have electoral ambitions that influence them to 
implement policies favouring their core constituencies (Hibbs, 1992) culminated into the Hibbs 
(1977) partisan or ideological cycle model. In this model, politicians or political parties are 
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either left wing or right wing. While the left wing politician affiliates with the working class 
and proposes expansionary policies, the right wing politicians align with the interest of business 
class individuals and propose anti-inflationary measures. Economic fluctuations are therefore, 
induced by the alternation of power between the left wing and right wing politician. The 
underlying prediction of the Partisan model is that macroeconomic policy will be expansionary 
(reduce unemployment, increase output and inflation) under left wing politicians than right 
wing ones. Except that politicians have ideological preferences, basic assumptions of the 
opportunistic model also apply to the partisan model. 
The Opportunistic model and its partisan variant alike have been subject to criticisms. Hibbs 
(1992) summarises the central theoretical critiques of these models as: 
a. Both models are premised upon an exploitable Philips curve, which depicts trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. This implies that parties can pick their preferred 
point in the inflation-unemployment trade-off space. Albeit, the underlying theoretical 
assumption of these models was attacked through the Lucas critique of the policy 
ineffectiveness of the Philip’s curve, upon which both models are developed. Gautier 
(2003) notes that later theoretical endeavours such as those by Rogoff (1990) and 
Cukierman & Meltzer (1986) addressed this point by considering a government budget 
instead of a Phillips curve in the opportunistic theoretical framework  
b. Voters are non-rational, such that they form expectations in a retrospective manner and 
are naive or ignorant of the workings of the economy. This notion was criticised on the 
reality that voters over time (no matter how naive) can see through the manipulative 
actions of politicians.  
Alesina (1988) notes that theoretical literature on political business cycles made essentially no 
progress after Nordhaus (1975) and McRae (1977) for several years, because of the (presumed) 
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devastating effect of the rational expectation critique. However, by the mid-eighties, political 
cycle theories which addressed the dual critique above were introduced, thus reviving the 
political cycle literature.  
 
Based on the New Classical macroeconomic framework, the newly introduced theories adopted 
the assumption of rational forward-looking voters, and were based in a general equilibrium 
framework. The models include: the Rational Opportunistic model (Rogoff (1988); Rogoff and 
Sibert (1990), Persson and Tabellini (1990) and the Rational Partisan model (Alesina, 1988; 
Chappell and Keech (1986, 1988)).  
Specifically, the Rational Opportunistic model maintains the basic assumptions of the pre-
rational models. Except that, voters are now forward looking and can evaluate economic 
performance since they have a working knowledge of the economy. In this model, forward 
looking voters make political decisions using incumbent politicians’ competence- ability to 
provide visible public goods at less tax cost. Gautier (2003) argues the assumption of a 
competent politician behaving opportunistically in the rational opportunistic model is counter 
intuitive as competent candidates are the ones to take advantage of the opportunistic behaviour 
to get re-elected. For Gautier (2003), this behaviour, however, does not resemble a competent 
candidate in that she does not show any capability in terms of managing the economy 
efficiently. 
In the same vein, the rational partisan model extends the partisan model unto the rational 
framework. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) as reviewed by Franzese (1999) states that in 
non-Rational Expectation partisan theory, left policymakers target expansionary outcomes than 
the right, with exploitable Phillips curve, they use their policy control to shift economic 
outcomes in these directions over their term. In Rational Expectation partisan theory, only 
unexpected monetary and fiscal policies can create such real-economic effects, so when left 
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(right) governments are elected, to the degree this was not completely foreseen, inflation is 
higher (lower) and growth, employment, and inflation rise (fall)... Thus, the primary 
differences between the Rational Expectation and non-Rational Expectation versions of 
partisan theory are whether the real effects of partisan shifts in government persist or fade over 
the term of the government. However, Gautier (2003) questions the plausibility of the wage-
contract assumption which allows labour unions to adjust for inflation variations after the 
election period in the rational partisan model 
 
Overall, the rational-based models are criticized on the following grounds: 
a. Nordhaus (1989) tests the assumption of rational voters and finds no empirical support 
for its existence.  
b. Another drawback of rational models is that they rely on timing assumptions to obtain 
information asymmetries among players which in turn create a cycle.  Timing 
assumptions are somewhat troublesome in that they are arbitrarily set, and without them 
the model’s result might not hold. 
The theoretical literature on political cycle is extended by a model that unifies the opportunistic 
and partisan models within a single framework. This unified Opportunistic-Partisan model is 
posited by Frey and Schneider (1978) based on the notion that partisan politicians, in a bid to 
be re-elected can resort to opportunistic policies. Frey and Schneider (1978) as cited from 
Tiganas and Peptine (undated) highlights the existence of a popularity function and one of 
adopted policies. For them, whether a partisan politician becomes opportunistic prior to 
election depends inversely on his popularity, as a less popular ideological incumbent is most 
likely to resort to opportunistic motives before elections. Hibbs (1992) however criticises this 
model for focusing only on fiscal policy and did not incorporate explicitly persistent cleavages 
distinguishing the United States parties.  
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However, Sieg (undated) applies the Frey and Schneider ideas to the rational platform. Sieg 
(undated) unifies the rational opportunistic and rational partisan models in a single framework. 
He states that a pre-election business cycle occurs due to signalling of competence and a post-
election political business cycle occurs due to uncertainty of the election’s winner and due to 
uncertainty of the pre-election monetary policy. 
 
Later on, in a different but complementary manner, political cycle models addressing country-
specific or context-specific issues have also been developed. For Ito (1989), Most of the works 
on political cycles have been conducted in the framework of the U.S. presidential system, in 
which elections come once every four years. Careful applications of the idea to other countries, 
taking into account a different political system, are scarce. As a result Ito (1989) builds a 
theoretical model for Japan’s parliamentary system. In this model, unlike the conventional 
models, timing of election is not fixed, but subject to the discretion of a Prime Minister. Instead 
of manipulating an economy in an attempt to line up the peak of business cycles to the fixed 
election timing, the incumbent party may opportunistically wait for a business cycle peak 
which is generated by autonomous forces of private sectors. Specifically, in Ito (1989), 
elections are no longer regarded as exogenous but endogenous variables. 
 
In the most recent theoretical developments in this research area, ad-hoc models which build 
upon existing theories are developed to explain political cycle within a specific setting. An 
example is Bloomberg and Hess (2000) build a dynamic general equilibrium model where 
politics is factored in. The paper constructs and examines a macroeconomic model which 
combines features from both real and political business cycle models. We augment a standard 




Then, are there remedies to politically-induced fluctuations? Nordhaus (1975) offers some 
suggestions. Some of them include: 
a. Improve the information available to voters so that they can judge and condemn the 
partisan nature of myopic policies. In this regard non-rational naive voters should be 
duly informed about the working of the economy. In direct application to the rational-
based model, information available to voters can be improved through a reduction to 
the barest minimum in information cost 
b. Encouraging participatory government improves politicians and voters access to 
collective decision making, so that incumbent politician cannot easily manipulate 
economic policies 
Yet another remedy suggested is the imposition of policy rules that serves as checks and 
balance on politicians’ decision making. 
The next section presents the methodological developments in the political cycle literature. 
2.3 Methodological Review of the Literature 
Atheoretical and Theoretical methods alike have been employed by existing studies, to derive 
empirical evidence for politically-determined cycles in the political cycle literature. In this 
review, the atheoretical method is emphasised, as it is used by more studies. A central reason 
for its preference among scholars is its simplicity and convenience over the theoretical method 
 
2.3.1 Atheoretical Method: 
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By atheoretical, it means that estimation techniques employed are void of any apriori economic 
theory. This methods used by existing studies in this class have either been univariate or 
multivariate-based. 
For the univariate methods, existing political cycle studies test for politically-determined 
fluctuations using single equations. For example, Krause and Mendez (2004) sum the most 
common test...to be, running an econometric autoregression of a macroeconomic variable (e.g; 
unemployment, output growth or inflation) on itself, other economic variables and a political 
dummy (for electoral years or the type). These single equations can be applied to country-
specific studies or cross-country panel studies. In the case of panel studies, variables capturing 
common fixed-effects are usually added to the single-equations 
 
Despite the popularity of these Autoregressive equations, Nordhaus (1975), the first study to 
provide empirical evidence on the existence of political cycles employed a non-parametric 
binomial probability technique. He tested 9 countries using annual unemployment and national 
election data, to calculate the probability that either unemployment rate rising or falling in any 
period is one-half, based on the assumption that successive occurrences are independent. First, 
since data on national election is non-quantifiable in the sense of economic time series, then 
the binomial probability are applicable. However, comparing non-parametric techniques with 
parametric ones, the conclusion derived from this study may not be as powerful as those from 
parametric methods. Another possible drawback in this study is that cyclical components of 
unemployment data was not extracted and analysed, as expected in cyclical studies. 
 
However, Hibbs (1977) is one of the first papers to have employed the formal atheoretical 
univariate technique as described initially. In his paper, Hibbs (1977) utilized the Box-Tiao 
intervention analysis to test partisan cycle using quarterly unemployment data for the United 
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States and Britain, over the period 1948:1 to 1972:4. Hibbs corrects for one of the drawbacks 
in Nordhaus (1975) by estimating an ARMA model where cyclical unemployment data are 
regressed on intervention variables. 
 
In the same vein, McCallum (1978) as cited from Allen, Sulock and Sabo (1988) test annual 
unemployment data for the United States in an Autoregressive Model with six political 
variables.Autoregressive models have continued to be used as a method providing empirical 
evidence of political cycle- either of Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ADL) or the 
Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) are employed.  
 
In a recent paper, Grier (2007) employs this technique to test opportunistic cycle in United 
States using quarterly output growth data over the time 1961-2004. His Autoregressive model 
was such that output growth was regressed on its lag, control variables and dummy variables. 
In this study, Grier (2007) used 34 regressors. Therefore, upon reviewing this work, concerns 
about model specification and loss in degree of freedom surfaces. However, a robustness check 
using CUSUM showed stability in estimated parameters. This allayed our concerns about this 
paper. 
 
Also, in a somewhat different manner, Pepinsky (2007) tests a model where seasonally adjusted 
government fiscal balance is regressed on control variables and political dummies, using 
quarterly data for the period 1967- 1990. Suspecting heterokedasticity and non-stationarity, he 
estimates a GARCH model. However, reporting standard robust errors are alternatives to 
estimating GARCH models as these errors prove to be robust to  misspecification and 
heteroskedasticity issues. 
 
Using a different method from the conventional Univariate AR models, Erlandsson (2001) tests 
political cycles using the time varying regression technique. An advantage of this technique is 
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testing the stability of estimated coefficients. He employs annual real output and 
unemployment data in Sweden for the period 1958-1998. In the paper, this technique estimate 
models where real output and unemployment are regressed on two partisan dummies, expected 
inflation and real inflation, respectively using a nonlinear least square estimation. Despite the 
seemingly robustness of this work, no mention was made of stationarity of the variables and 
cyclically-adjusting the variables. 
 
Another context in which univariate single equations are used is in cross-country studies. In 
this case, the single-equations are dynamic panel specifications where a macroeconomic 
variable is regressed on its lagged term(s), political indicator variables and in some cases, 
control variables. In addition, variables capturing common fixed-effects are included. In 
defending panel estimations, Chatfield (1996) as cited from Pepinsky (2007) notes that only in 
cases where available data can provide at least 100 uninterrupted observations can researchers 
be confident in such estimations. Also Alesina and Roubini (1992) notes that the advantage of 
a multi-country study is that, of course, one has many more degrees of freedom, including 
observations. 
 
Alesina and Roubini (1992) run a dynamic panel OLS regression on a model with fixed effects 
and constant slopes to account for differences in long-term growth rates, unemployment, and 
inflation across 18 OECD countries in their panel study. They assume that the other parameters 
of the model are constant and equal across countries. However, Alesina and Roubini work is 
subject to potential bias because Brender and Drazen (2004) notes that using common fixed 
effects in an OLS regression with lagged dependent variables as found in Alesina and Roubini 
(1992), introduces a potential estimation bias. To deal with this potential bias, Brender and 
Drazen (2004) in their study on opportunistic cycle in a panel of developed and developing 




In the same vein, in their dynamic panel regression, Shi and Svensson (2006) use a more robust 
approach. For a large panel data set of 85 developed and developing countries, after taking note 
of the drawback of the OLS fixed effect estimator, use the GMM estimators to estimate a 
regression where government budget balance as a per cent of GDP is regressed on two lagged 
period of government budget balance, two control variables (log of GDP and GDP growth 
rates), a country dummy and an election indicator. For them, the GMM estimators are more 
robust since they control for unobserved country-specific effects as well as bias from lagged 
dependent variable (budget balance).they carry out a serial correlation and identification test. 
They test and confirm the presence of political budget cycles is prevalent in developing 
countries than developed countries. 
 
However, Potfrake (2010) notes that GMM estimates are only appropriate for large samples. 
In their study of 21 OECD Countries, Potfrake (2010) developed a dynamic panel model where 
GDP growth is regressed on its lag term, political dummies, exogenous control variables, and 
fixed effects. They note the potential bias arising from using a fixed effect estimator in models 
with lagged dependent variables, but are constrained from using the GMM estimator based on 
the small sample size. Based on this observation, Potfrake (2010) applies Bruno’s (2005a, 
2005b) bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator for dynamic panel data models 
with small N. His diagnostic test on initial estimates add robustness to his work, as he tests for 
the existence of unrestricted serial correlation by applying the Wooldridge test, he also applies 
heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) Newey-West type standard errors and 
variance-covariance estimates and finds estimates unaffected. 
 
In a different manner from the use of conventional dynamic panel models, Wright (2011) in 
his study of political cycles in several non-democractic countries employs a dynamic panel 
Error correction model. He argues that this method is suited to allow for more general test of 
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the Long run and Short run impact of elections. In another framework Potrafke (2006) use a 
structural Seemingly unrelated regression (SURE) technique on state expenditure data in a 
panel of 16 states within Germany for the period 1974 to 2004. However, the performance of 
structural SURE estimation in T=31, worth questioning. 
 
The studies reviewed above employ the univariate timeseries and panel frameworks, to test the 
existence of political cycles. However, few studies (such as Faust and Irons (1999), Berger and 
Woitek (1997)) employ a Multivariate Vector Autoregressive Models (VAR). Unlike the 
univariate analysis, this technique is based on the premise that in reality, there is causal 
feedback relationship among economic variables.  
 
Also Univariate analysis differs from multivariate technique as it treats political variables as 
exogenous. However, Faust and Irons (1996) questions this assumption and canvasses about 
the endogeneity of political variables. Thus, to capture the endogeneity of political variables in 
relation to the economy, Faust and Irons (1996) tests evidence of political cycle by estimating 
an augmented VAR model with four economic variables and political dummies and then 
presenting corresponding impulse response function. Although Faust and Irons (1996) 
emphasise the endogeniety of political variables, according to Ito (1989) political variables 
(election dates) are necessarily endogenous only when election timing are flexible. 
Furthermore if Gujarati (2010) suggestion is anything to go by, then one finds that estimated 
VAR co-efficients are difficult to interpret, then, inference made by Faust and Irons using the 
VAR estimated co-efficient are inconclusive. 
 
In the same vein, Berger and Woitek (1997) estimates an augmented 6 by 1 vector VAR model 
(net production, monetary aggregate, inflation rate, unemployment rate, Bundesbank discount 
rate and federal government deficit) and political dummies using monthly data for the period 
1950-1989 in Germany. Unlike Faust and Irons (1996), Berger and Woitek (1997) estimate a 
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VAR model with trend, while using the VAR model without trends as a robustness check. 
Robustness checks are rare features in most of studies reviewed. 
2.3.2 Theoretical Method 
By using the theoretical method, it implies that political studies employed technique based on 
apriori economic theory. Presently, theoretical-based political business cycle works utilize a 
general equilibrium framework and are sparse.  
An example is Milani (2007) who test various political business cycle theories adopting an 
optimizing New Keynesian model with a monetary and fiscal policy mix as the main setting 
the model using full-information Bayesian methods. 
Another is Bloomberg and Hess (2000) who simulates and calibrates a standard real business 
cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence 
using U.S post-war annual data. 
2.4 Empirical Review of the Literature 
Empirical inquiry into the phenomenon ‘Political Business Cycle’ started in the 1970s. It was 
needful to subject existing theoretical models to empirical testing, in a bid to confirm the 
validity of proposition of the existence of politically-induced fluctuations. Empirical work in 
this research area, started with Nordhaus (1975). Since then, the central question asked in 
empirical literature on political business cycle has been: Does a political cycle exist?  
Other inquiries have focused on the size and magnitude of political cycle and on timing of 
elections. However, in line with the first objective of this work: to test for evidence of political 
cycle, this empirical review selectively focuses on literature addressing this question. 
Nordhaus (1975) in his seminal work is the first to empirically test the existence of a political 
cycle. He tested his opportunistic model for 9 countries, using annual unemployment data for 
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the period 1947-1972 in these countries with a non-parametric binomial probability method. 
Specifically testing the hypothesis that during an electoral period, unemployment should rise 
in the first half and fall in the second half, he failed to find evidence for his model in 4 of the 9 
countries, found evidence in 3 countries only, while evidence on the remaining 2 countries, 
remained inconclusive. This result suggests a bleak performance of his model to empirical 
testing. 
In the same vein, McCallum (1978) and Paldam (1979) (as cited from Alesina and Roubini 
(1992)) test the opportunistic model in the United States and OECD countries, respectively and 
failed to find evidence of political cycle. Also, recent empirical evidences corroborate the poor 
performance of opportunistic cycles. 
 
For instance, Alesina and Roubini (1992) were unable to find empirical evidence for the 
opportunistic model in 18 OECD countries using quarterly output and unemployment data and 
political data on election date, date of changes of government and political orientation of 
government over the period 1960-1987. One central question asked in the paper asked was if 
the movement in GNP growth and unemployment were affected by timing of election and of 
changes in government. Their result was such that of the 18 countries, only in two did they find 
evidence of increase in output and reduction in unemployment, in election years.  
 In an inconclusive result, Batool and Sieg (2009) test the opportunistic model in Pakistan using 
annual data on unemployment, inflation and Real GDP growth for the period 1973-2009. They 
estimate an ARIMAX model and find that unemployment and inflation support the Nordhaus 
opportunistic model, while they find no evidence of the opportunistic cycle in Real GDP 
growth. The study however, makes no mention of stationarity tests and de-trended series, which 
are essential in employing an ARIMA model and in business cycle analysis, respectively. 
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Till date, empirical findings on opportunistic cycles are perceived to have fared less than 
expected. Alesina and Roubini (1992) argue that there is relatively little evidence of a Nordhaus 
(1975) type opportunistic cycle on growth and unemployment because: First, a "rational" 
electorate imposes a limit on this behaviour; an excessive attempt to pursue opportunistic 
policies may be perceived as counterproductive by policymakers. Second, it may be quite 
difficult to create expansions precisely timed before elections. 
 
Conversely, Tufte (1978) remains one of few studies that confirmed the validity of 
opportunistic cycles. He does for the United States. Also, Grier (2007) tests opportunistic 
model in the United States, over the period 1961-2004 using quarterly data on real GDP growth. 
The model estimates an autoregressive model with Real GDP and finds output growth is around 
2 percentage points higher than it otherwise would be in the year and a half preceding the 
election, thereby confirming the existence of opportunistic cycles. 
 
In another vein, Hibbs (1977) Partisan cycles have proved to have more empirical evidence 
than the opportunistic ones. Franzese (2002) as cited from Potfrake (2010) asserts that many 
existing empirical studies typically uncovered stronger evidence of Partisan than opportunistic 
cycles in real economic performance. Drazen (2000b) also confirms the existence of a clear 
partisan cycle in the United States and in other Countries. 
For instance, unlike Nordhaus (1975)’s inconclusive result on opportunistic cycles, Hibbs 
(1977) in his study, found convincing evidence for the existence of partisan/ideological cycles. 
Specifically, Hibbs (1977) sought to test the hypothesis that shifts in political regime of 
government will be associated with gradual changes in economic variables. Using time series 
quarterly unemployment data for the United States  and Great Britain over the period 1948:1 
to 1972:4, and with a Box-Tiao (1975) Intervention analysis, he showed that fluctuations in 
unemployment data were significantly influenced by the ideology of political party. His results 
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show that under left wing government, unemployment reduced and inflationary trends gained 
momentum, than right wing governments. 
In testing the Hibbs Partisan model, Erdlasson (2001) finds mixed support for partisan cycle. 
He employs a nonlinear least square method to estimate annual Real GDP and unemployment 
data for Sweden. While finding support for partisan effects in Real GDP, he was unable to 
show evidence in Unemployment data. However, not working with de-trended series raises 
concern about the validity of this result to the study of fluctuations. 
Also, in their study on Germany, Berger and Woitek (1997) test empirical evidence of the 
Partisan theory using a Vector Autoregressive model (VAR) augmented with political 
dummies on monthly unemployment, net production, monetary aggregate, bundesbank 
discount rate and federal government deficit data. They find no support for partisan cycle in 
net production (output) and unemployment data. They, however find no support in inflation 
data after more variables were added to the estimated model. Their result is convincing as they 
use monthly data, more relevant to capturing fluctuations than lower frequency data. 
Thus, from the review above, while some empirical findings support the opportunistic, some 
do not. Then, the empirical review of the pre-rational opportunistic and partisan models shows 
mixed evidence of the existence of political cycle. However, we explore next, the empirical 
performance of the rational opportunistic and partisan models. 
Faal (2007) in his study on political budget cycles in New Guinea uses quarterly seasonally 
adjusted fiscal policies variables (government total revenue, total expenditure, recurrent 
expenditure, development expenditure, and net credit to the public sector) over the sample 
period 1988:1 -2004:4 to test the predictions of the Rogoff (1990) rational opportunistic model. 
His finding conform with the prediction of this model, such that  there was clear pattern of pre-
election manipulation of fiscal instruments by incumbent governments—mainly increased 
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development spending and overall primary expenditure-followed in most cases by a 
retrenchment in the post-election period, albeit the model was not confirmed for total revenue 
and recurrent expenditure. 
 
Khemani (2000) studies the effect of state legislative election on policies of state government 
in 14 states of India, over the sample period 1960-1994, in order to confirm the existence of 
rational opportunistic cycle in fiscal policy variables and public service delivery. As peculiar 
to parliamentary elections, they deal with endogeniety problems first (Ito, 1989) and then 
estimate his dynamic panel model. His paper was unable to lend empirical support to the 
rational opportunistic model on tax, expenditure and budget deficit variables. However, he 
found support for public policy variables such as visible road construction. To Khemani, this 
pattern of findings is somewhat counter-intuitive because it does not support the idea of an 
opportunistic politicians spending to sway poor and uneducated voters. Based on this, he 
develops another framework since existing models of political budget cycles cannot lend 
credence to his finding. 
 
Barberia and Avelino (2011) test the rational opportunistic model in 18 Latin American 
democracies over the period 1973-2008. They use a panel dynamic model where fiscal policy 
variables (Government spending, government revenue and budget balance all as per cent of 
GDP) are regressed on their lagged terms, control variables and electoral dummy. Their finding 
confirms the existence of political budget cycles. Albeit, they argue that existence of budget 
cycles in Latin American democracies depend on the definitions used for democracy and recent 
democracy and also on the rule used to code the election year. 
 
In empirically testing the rational partisan theory, Alesina and Sachs (1986) estimate a system 
of equations using the least square technique and imposing a non-linear restriction (as in 
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theory) to provide evidence for the rational partisan model. They test data on GNP growth and 
money growth over the period 1948-1984 for the United States. Their findings confirmed the 
existence of rational partisan theory in monetary policy such that a left government is 
concerned with output while a right government is concerned with growth. However, in using 
the least square technique, stationarity tests which prevent spurious estimations were not 
mentioned. Furthermore, as necessary for short run analysis, they did not de-trend the series 
used. Still, Heckelman (2006) states that some of the evidence supporting the rational partisan 
model is due to Alesina himself, and that there are plenty of studies that do not generally 
support the model 
In support of the Rational partisan model, Maloney et al (2002) develops and test a dynamic 
version of the rational partisan model on 20 OECD countries over the sample period 1960-
1998. They estimate a reduced form equation where economic variables are regressed on 
lagged and lead terms of economic variables and then on political variables. Their findings are 
consistent with theoretical predictions that left wing incumbents are found to increase output, 
but the increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it. They also test the effect of central 
bank independence and fixed exchange rate and find that central bank independence reduces 
the rational partisan cycle. 
 
To confirm Heckelman (2006) assertion, Heckelman (2002) in a different vein tests a variable 
version of the rational partisan theory, that captures uncertainty over timing of elections; using 
quarterly data on output and unemployment in Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom. He 
tests models where de-trended real GDP is regressed on party popularity variable and party 
variable. The empirical results yielded are mixed. Specifically, the evidence is weak for Canada 




Following empirical review of the political cycle theories: Pre-rational opportunistic and 
partisan models; rational opportunistic and partisan model, we find mixed results on the 
evidence of political business cycles.   
In the next section we argue that the mixed results depend on the differences in the type of 
macroeconomic variable used and the type of country (developed or developing) used in 
existing empirical literature. 
2.4.1 Macroeconomic Variables: Outcomes versus Policy Variables. 
In answering the central question as initially posed: Does political cycle exist? A norm in 
existing literature is to test political cycles in macroeconomic variables, using real economic 
outcomes variables (such as Real Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment and Inflation) or 
macroeconomic policy variables (such as Government expenditure, Government revenue, 
Money supply, etc). 
Initially, the proof of political business cycles was tested using macroeconomic outcome 
variables-Unemployment and/or real Gross Domestic Product data (Grier (2007); Hibbs 
(1977); Nordhaus (1975)). Brender and Drazen (2004) argue that given the lack of empirical 
evidence for political cycles in economic outcomes, a literature examining possible cycles in 
policy instruments developed.  
 
Also, in view of the mixed evidence, Krause and Mendez (2004) notes that results of empirical 
tests change noticeably with the measure of economic activity that is chosen as the dependent 
variable. Krause and Mendez argue that studies that use GDP growth measures as dependent 
variables generally support partisan cycles theories but do not find evidence of opportunism... 
in contrast, studies that use inflation as the dependent variable tend to reject partisan cycles and 




Jula (2001) use annual unemployment data over the period 1990-2000, to test several 
hypotheses. Of importance, is his hypothesis capturing partisan political behaviour. He tests 
this hypothesis across counties in Romania using a static panel model where shares of votes 
received by parties depend on unemployment rate and an electoral dummy. Using the OLS 
method of estimation, his result is consistent with the pre-rational partisan model, such that left 
wing parties are relatively more concerned about unemployment rate and economic growth 
compared with the right wing ones. 
Higashijima (2011) employs monthly Consumer Price Index (Inflation) data over the period 
1995-2010, in Kyrgyzstan. He estimates a model where CPI is regressed on electoral dummies 
capturing all types of elections: Parliamentary, presidential and referendum across three 
political regimes and finds evidence for the existence of political cycles 
Berlemann and Markwardt (2003) employ monthly inflation and unemployment data in a panel 
study of 17 countries to test both pre-rational and rational partisan theories. They use both 
descriptive statistics and a Pooled OLS dynamic panel estimation technique and find significant 
partisan differences in inflation rates under left-wing and rightwing but not for unemployment 
rates for pre-rational partisan model, while for the rational partisan model, they find significant 
temporary increases in the unemployment rate after unexpected elections of right-wing 
governments and temporarily decreasing unemployment rates after unexpected elections of 
left-wing ones. Thus, supporting pre-rational partisan model in inflation rates and not in 
unemployment data presents mixed evidence. 
Erlandsson (2001) utilize real output and unemployment data for Sweden to validate the pre-
rational partisan cycle. Using a time varying parameter regression, he finds empirical support 
for the partisan theory, such that, ceteris paribus, aggregate demand policy under left-wing 
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governments is relatively more expansionary than under right-wing governments, even if the 
expansionary policy sometimes leads to higher inflation. 
 
Our empirical review negates the assertions that empirical support of political cycles in 
macroeconomic outcomes (output, unemployment and inflation) are hard come by, since the 
reviewed papers mainly support political cycles in these variables. Based on this, we reject the 
assertion of Drazen and Brender (2004).   
 
Grier (1987) tests the support of opportunistic model on monetary policy variable in the United 
States. Specifically, the paper considers presidential influence on the Federal Reserve using 
data on money growth. He first tests an Autoregressive model of 9 lags, where quarterly money 
growth in the sample period 1961-1980, is regressed on 6 political dummies. He estimates 
another model where the sample period is extended to 1982 and three economic control 
variables added- lagged per cent GNP gap, lagged difference between full employment 
unemployment and actual unemployment; and lagged unemployment. In both models, he finds 
evidence of political monetary cycle.  
Interestingly, in the second model augmented with GNP gap and unemployment data, he finds 
no evidence of cycle in unemployment data. This supports the view that despite the general 
rejection of (opportunistic) political business cycles in the US during the modern era... the 
accumulated evidence for opportunistic monetary cycles  is quite strong  (Heckelman and 
wood, 2005) 
However, Heckelman and Wood (2005) tests seasonally adjusted quarterly broad money data 
to test the possibility of a historical political business cycle over the period 1879:1-1914:3 and 
1914:4-1932:4, both corresponding to the era of the Independent Treasury and the introduction 
of the Federal Reserve Bank. They use an Autoregressive distributed lag models, Polynomial 
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distributed lag and develop reaction functions. In all, they failed to find evidence that monetary 
policy changed systematically over a four-year period timed around presidential elections, 
either under the Fed or the Independent Treasury. 
 
On the fiscal policy variable side, Youssef (undated) use annual government expenditure, 
revenue and deficit data over the sample period 1987-2011 in Egypt to test evidence for 
opportunistic cycles. He employs an Autoregressive Distributed lag model and finds only 
revenue as being statistically significant and negatively affected in election years. 
 
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2003) examine de-trended monthly data on fiscal policies and 
economic growth variables over the period 1996-2003. They test opportunistic cycles in these 
variables for regional elections in Russia. Using a dynamic panel model, their findings give 
credence to cycles in fiscal policies but not in economic growth. 
From this section, there is no support that the use of macroeconomic outcomes or policy 
variables explains the mixed results in empirical, and then we turn to find if division into 
developed and developing economies explain this assertion.  
2.4.2  Developed and Developing economies 
A second reason tested for mixed empirical finding in literature is that existence of political 
cycles can be country-dependent, especially along the division of either developed or 
developing-country studies. 
Empirical testing of political cycles began with developed countries, especially the OECDs. 
Upon the weak evidence posed by the data of developed countries to political cycle theories, 
scholars began to shift focus to developing countries. At first one may have been apprehensive 
in applying existing theories to studies on developing countries, since they lack the institutional 
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settings on which existing theories are based (i.e; well developed democratic institutions). Yet, 
application of these theories to developing countries has proven to be more robust, when 
compared to studies on developed countries. 
For instance, Brender and Drazen (2004) tests for the presence of political deficit cycle in a 
panel data study comprising 68 democratic countries. They separate these countries into new 
democracies and established democracies. By analogy new democracies comprise transition 
countries which are typically developing countries while established democracies are 
developed countries. Brender and Drazen test the hypothesis that political cycles are more 
prevalent in new democracies. Their results fail to reject the hypothesis. They find that political 
cycle exists in their test on the total sample. However, upon removing new democracies from 
the sample, the political deficit cycles fades. 
This finding illustrates that political cycles are readily detected in developing countries than in 
industrialized countries. A reason for this as argued by Brender and Drazen (2004) is the high 
likelihood that politicians in new democracies  manipulate fiscal instruments so as to increase 
their probability for re-election than those in developed economies.  
 
In the same light, the study on Political budget cycle: Do they differ across Countries and why? 
by Shi and Svensson (2006) show evidence of a greater magnitude of political budget cycle in 
developing countries than in developed ones. Just like Brender and Drazen (2004), they argue 
that larger portion of politician’s rent for remaining in office and of uninformed voters magnify 
the cycle in developing countries. Specifically, Shi and Svensson (2006) build and test a 
context-based moral hazard model of electoral competition on a panel data of 85 countries, 




In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Block (1999) using annual data for 44 SSA 
countries over the period 1980 to 1995 sought the presence of Rogoff (1990)’s rational 
opportunistic cycle on fiscal and monetary policy instruments. His results supports the presence 
of cycles in policy variables such as fiscal deficits, expenditures, government consumption, 
and net claims on government as shares of GDP, money growth, interest rates, inflation, 
seignorage, and nominal exchange rate changes. For him, Political business cycle may mean 
frequent reversals in fiscal and monetary policy reforms. Block’s findings may be unsurprising 
since a portion of his study period (1989-1995) coincided with increased political transition in 
Africa. 
 
Barberia and Avelino (2011) in their study on Latin America democracies in the period 1973 
and 2008 also confirm the existence of political cycles. They focus on fiscal policy variables 
such as government total expenditure, total revenue, and budget deficits. They also find that 
the magnitude of political cycle depends not on the likelihood that politician will manipulate 
economic policies as Brender and Drazen (2004) but on democratic transitions. 
 
Furthermore, several country-specific studies also give provide significant support to the 
existence of political cycles in developing countries. 
 
Li (2011) in a study on China develops and tests a three-period model based on Persson and 
Tabellini (2000) which integrates China’s institutional features. In this model, provincial 
leaders induce cycle because they desire to be promoted, after evaluation by a central 
government. In testing this model Li (2011) focuses on real capital formation growth rather 
than output growth, since real capital formation growth has been the driving force of China’s 
output growth.  Using provincial panel data in China over the period 1983 and 2007, Li finds 
that real capital formation growth is 7:3 percentage points higher in peak years than in the other 
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years. Li’s result provides insight as to the strong magnitude of political cycle in a developing 
country. 
 
Tarawalie et al (undated) test for opportunistic and partisan cycle using time series data on 
Ghana and Nigeria. Their results depict that Ghana experienced political cycles in 
macroeconomic outcomes (Real GDP growth), macroeconomic policy variables (fiscal deficit, 
government revenue, government expenditure and money supply) except inflation rates. On 
the other hand, political cycles were detected in all the variables listed for the Nigerian 
economy. For them, the existence of cycles in macroeconomic variables in the two economies 
under study portends implication for macroeconomic convergence, which is necessary for the 
formation of a monetary union in the West African Monetary Zone. 
 
Another dimension to the political cycle literature is country-specific or cross-country studies 
on non-democratic regimes. Non-democratic regimes negate the democratic-institutional 
feature of political cycle theories. Yet these models are nonetheless applied to seeking the 
presence of politically induced cycles in authoritarian regimes. This is on the ground that 
dictators are liable to increase spending during elections so as to buy political support and show 
off political strength to opponents. This is unlike politicians in democratic regimes, who engage 
in economic policy manipulation so as to increase their re-election chances. 
For instance (Wright (2011); Youssef (undated); Pepinsky (2007)) investigate political cycles 
in authoritarian regimes. All three studies provide strong facts for political cycles. While 
Wright (2011) examines support for spending cycle in a sample of electoral authoritarian 
regimes, Pepinsky (2007) focus on Malysian government expenditure data over the period 1967 
to 1997. Pepinsky (2007) findings are expected in the light of Wright (2011) argument that 
‘evidence from single-country case studies suggests the presence of electoral budget cycles in 




However, Youssef (undated) in his paper on non-democratic regime in Egypt decompose 
government into spending and revenue. Using annual for pre-revolution Egypt over the period 
1987 to 2011, finds that government revenue rather than expenditure, exhibits opportunistic 
cycle. Youssef’s finding provides cogent arguments for the need to study political cycles in 
composition of government budgets.  
 
However studies on developed countries, as noted beforehand, provide weak proof for 
politically-induced cycles. Reasons for these outcomes may include: the presence of strong 
political institutions, which constrain the tendency of politicians to engage in self-interested 
political activities; macroeconomic stability as marked by the period of the Great Moderation 
in industrialized countries and a highly informed electorate.  
 
For instance, a weak or no result of political cycle in developed countries is reflected in the 
works of Andrikopoulos et al (2004). In their study, these authors employed both opportunistic 
and partisan hypotheses in fiscal policy on European Union economies and found little or no 
evidence for these hypotheses. They interpret their finding as: politicians in EU economies 
have pursued stabilization policies rather than policies that creates business cycles. 
Against the background that past studies had provided evidence for political cycle using 
German data, Berger and Woitek (1997) set out to affirm this empirical study. For them, such 
findings negate the sound fiscal economic policy and independent Bundesbank, which 
Germany was known for. Using monthly data and taking on another estimation technique, they 
test the Opportunistic and (Hibbs and Alesina) Partisan models, respectively, on net industrial 
output (NPI), unemployment (UE), consumer prices (CPI), Monetary aggregates (M1) and the 
Bundesbank discount rate (r) . They find no support for both theories, except a weak evidence 




In a different fashion, Milani (2007) examines opportunistic and partisan cycles in an 
optimizing New Keynesian framework in the United States. Using quarterly data over the 
period 1966:1 to 2006:4, the model fail to provide evidence for partisan cycles in fiscal and 
monetary policy. It also rejected the opportunistic hypothesis in fiscal policy. However, it 
provides some, probably weak confirmation of opportunistic cycles in monetary policy. This 
confirmation is similar to Berger and Woitek (1997). Milani (2007) findings may be consistent 
with Tempelman (2007) as cited from Milani (2007) who argues that the positive evidence of 
political cycles in US monetary policy...may be due to their use of a long sample. 
 
This assertion is corroborated by Maloney et al (2007). In their work, they develop and test a 
dynamic version of the Rational Partisan cycle model on monetary policy in 20 OECD 
countries for the period 1960-1998. Their results, different other studies on developed 
countries, rarely provide strong support for the rational partisan cycle. 
 
Potrafke (2010) in his research paper ‘Political cycles and economic performance in OECD 
countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006’ rejects proof for opportunistic and Partisan 
cycles in annual GDP growth. This finding is not surprising, since weak or no empirical support 
exist for macro outcomes in developed countries. 
From this section, we find support that mixed empirical results in literature are to a large extent 
dependent on country-context. 
Table 2.1: Summary on some empirical Political cycle studies 
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2.4 Summary and Conclusion 
To re-iterate, theoretical, methodological and empirical reviews of the political cycle literature 
was carried out in this Chapter. 
 
In the theoretical review, five major theories of political theories were outlined and critiqued. 
From this, one notices that political cycle theories are premised on an electoral system. As a 
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result, political cycle theories which considers politically-induced fluctuations outside an 
electoral framework are non-existent 
 
In the methodological review, it was discovered that both atheretical and theoretical methods 
were used. Studies using the atheoretical method explored several estimation techniques, 
however, the Autoregressive Distributed Lag models stands out, in some other cases, the 
Autoregressive Moving Average models were employed. In the theoretical method strand, the 
construction of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model was sparsely used. 
 
The empirical review revealed mixed evidence of the existence of political cycles. We 
examined if the mixed empirical evidence was a result of the type of economic variable tested 
or was country-dependent. Specifically, we examined if empirical findings from political cycle 
papers that tested macroeconomic outcomes (output, unemployment and inflation) or 
macroeconomic policy variable (fiscal policy, monetary policy) were different. No trend as 
such was found. Further, it was checked if country-context explained the mixed evidence and 
then, one finds that more evidence exists for political cycle in developing countries that the 
developed ones. 
Also, of the developing countries’ studies, sparse empirical studies on PBCs in SSA, especially 
Nigeria existed. Thus, empirical works on PBC is virgin territory in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
and, specifically Nigeria. The articles on PBCs for SSA and Nigeria to my knowledge include: 
a. Tarawalie et al (undated) Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Convergence 
in the WAMZ: The case of Ghana and Nigeria  
 
b. Block, S.A  (1999)  ‘Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic 
Reform: The case of Africa’ 
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The empirical review further reveals that existence of political cycles, timing of election are 
the main questions asked, but we find little question being asked by the nature  of political 
cycle detected. 
Therefore, from the theoretical, methodological and empirical reviews, we find the following 
gaps: 
a. Theoretical review: Political cycle theories outside an electoral framework do not exist. 
This type of theory is premised on the notion that irrespective of the type of political 
regimes, as long as a political regime changes, the economy fluctuates. This study 
attempts to fill this gap. 
b. Methodological review: There is sparse use of the theoretical DSGE models in the 
political cycle literature. However, this study employs the atheoretical method on 
grounds of simplicity and convenience. Between the Autoregressive distributed lag 
model and the Autoregressive Moving Average methods, this study opts for the ARMA 
models as it uses a Maximum Likelihood iterative procedure which are not subject to 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates as the OLS procedure will, under serially 
correlated error terms.  
c. Empirical Literature: There is sparse literature on this research area in the SSA and in 
Nigeria. This study also addresses this gap. Further on, we extend the political cycle 
literature by considering the cyclical properties of political cycle. To achieve this, we 
apply a dynamic factor model to extract a political shock component. To the best of our 
knowledge and as confirmed by the methodological review, dynamic factor models 
have not been applied to political cycle literature, although they have applied to 





















SOME STYLIZED FACTS 
3.0  Political Regimes and Macroeconomic Fluctuations  
3.1  Introduction 
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In this Chapter, some stylized facts on the correlation between politics and economic outcomes 
are deduced and used to explain the statistical political economy of Nigeria. In it, an overview 
of politics, economic performance and their interaction in Nigeria over the  period 1960-2010 
are highlighted. In this light, the chapter is divided into six sections. Section two present 
stylized facts about the interaction between politics and economics. Section three considers the 
empirical regularities pertaining to Nigeria’s political system, in section four, a statistical 
overview of the Nigerian economy since 1960 is presented. In the fifth section, the political 
economy of nigeria is charcterised. Finally, a summary of stylized facts derived in the chapter, 
and conclusions are made in the sixth section.   
 
First, What are stylized facts?  
Stylized facts are empirical regularities showing preliminary statistical relationship among 
several relevant variables. In the case of this study, it is among the political and economic 
variables to be used in this study. 
 
Its documentation has often been used to provide an empirical basis for the formulation of 
theoretical models of the business cycle and as a way to discriminate among alternative classes 
(Agenor et al, 1999). In line with this study, the stylized facts derived is used to characterise 
the political economy of Nigeria, then to select the most relevant political cycle theory and 
finally, serve as descriptive tools for interpreting political cycles in Nigeria. 
 
3.2   Politics and Economic outcomes 
That politics influences economic outcomes either in the positive or otherwise is obvious when 
one considers the interrelatedness and dynamic nature of  economic, political and social forces 
within a society. For another reason, politics influence the nature of economic institutions in 
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any economy, as they define the rule of the game by specifying the limit of economic power 
and decision making (North, 1990) 
For instance, the fact that political institutions affects economic outcomes is evident in the case 
of China and the United States of America. The existing political institution (communism) of 
pre-1949 China influenced central-planning oriented economic policies, just as the political 
institution of post-1978 China when more liberal Deng Xiaoping took over power reflects the 
more liberal economic policies obtainable in China. In a different manner, the democratic 
structure of the United States is correlated with the laissez-faire economic policies prevalent 
there. 
Illustrating the assertion that politics inform the type of economic institution obtainable in a 
society, we use indices of economic freedom (proxy for economic outcome) and political 







  Table 3.1: Free economies and their political systems 
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Index of Economic 
Freedom 


































                          Source: Heritage.org and Freedom House 
Note: In the table, we first present the ten most free economies in the world as sourced from Index of Economic 
Freedom 2013. This index is published by Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation, Countries with higher 
index have freer economies. Then, we correlate the economic freedom with political freedom using the index of 
political freedom. The Index on political freedom which is sourced from Freedom House. 
In the table, of the 10 most economically free countries according to the Index of economic 
freedom, 8 have free political systems, while the other 2 (Hong Kong and Singapore) have 
partly free political systems. 
An implication of this finding is that although a perfect correlation between politics and 
economic outcome does not exist; yet, a correlation between politics and economic outcome is 
plausible. To confirm the validity of this finding, we compare the least economically free 
countries with their political systems and find that the political systems of the least 
economically free countries are not free. 
  Table 3.2: Least economic free countries with their political system 
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           Source: Heritage.org and Freedom House 
Therefore, based on the preceding finds, it is concluded that there is a plausible positive 
correlation between politics and economic outcomes. This correlation is interpreted as a causal 
relation from politics to economic outcomes. 
Stylized fact 1: There is a plausible positive correlation between politics and economic 
outcomes 
In the next section, stylized fact one is examined in nigeria. However, before asserting that 
politics influences economic outcomes in Nigeria, for comprehensiveness, we explore 
separatetly the phenomenom ‘politics’ and ‘economic outcome’  
3.3 Politics in Nigeria 
3.3.1 Background: Some Historical Facts on Nigeria 
The nation state ‘Nigeria’ was created in 1914. This was with the amalgamation by the British 
colonial rule, of North and South Protectorate. The British colonisation started with the 
annexation of Lagos as a crown colony in 1861; and the creation of a southern protectorate in 
1900. Nigeria gained independence in 1960. 
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The name ‘Nigeria’ meaning Niger area was derived from the Niger River, which was 
suggested by Flora Shaw. With a population of 125 million (2001 estimate), Nigeria is the most 
populous Black Country in Africa and in the world. Its population makes up one-fifth of the 
African Continent. The country is bordered by Chad, Cameroon, Benin, Niger and the Atlantic 
Ocean. It has a total land mass of 923, 768 sq.km. 
Nigeria is a pluralistic society, ethnically and religiously diverse. The country has over 250 
tribes and languages, albeit the three main tribes are the Hausa/Fulanis (North), the Igbos 
(South-East) and the Yorubas (South-West). The three major tribes make up 70 per cent of the 
population. Also, the country is said to be evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. Her 
Official language is English. 
Agriculture is the dominant economic activity in this country. 
3.3.2  Political Outcomes in Nigeria 
Drazen (2001) defines politics as the exercise of power and authority. By power, he means the 
ability of an individual (or group) to achieve outcomes that reflect his objectives. Authority is 
described as individuals or groups making decisions for others with their explicit or tacit 
permission. In Nigeria, this exercise of power and authority is handled by a head of 
government. For every head of government in power, a political regime is in place. Then, it 
suffices to say that politics as marked by the interaction of persons with power and authority, 
plays out in the form of political regime inherent in country per time. Consequently, political 
regimes define the politics of a society. 
What then is a political regime? Fishman (1990) as cited by Ploberger (2012) defines it as the 
formal or informal organisations at the centre of political power determining who has access 
to political power. 
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We outline a selective political history of nigeria, with emphasis on the regimes which have 
been in place since Nigeria became an independent state in 1960. Metz (1991)1 sums the 
political history of Nigeria as: 
“The Story of Nigeria during the postcolonial 
era has been one of a search for the 
constitutional and political arrangement that, 
while allowing for the self-expression of its 
socially and culturally diverse peoples, would 
not hinder the construction of a nation out of 
this mosaic. In this search, the country has 
experienced cycles of military and civilian rule, 
civil war, and peaceful reconstruction” 
Upon independence from British colonial rule in 1960, Nigeria began her self-governance. The 
first post-colonial government was a civilian regime headed by Dr. Nnamdi Azikwe. The 
government was a coalition of two conservative parties of the National People Congress (NPC), 
skewed in the ideals of Northern Nigeria and the National Council of Nigeria and the 
Cameroons (NCNC) of South-East Nigeria. Opposing this coalition was the leftist Action 
Group of South-West Nigeria.  
Metz (1991) notes this regime was fraught with political tension spurred along ethnic lines. For 
instance, the dominant Northern Nigeria (a result of holding majority seats in parliament) was 






In short, the attendant political tension arising along ethnic divide led to political economy 
instability in this regime, such that the existence of the regime termed as the First Republic was 
short-lived by a Military Coup on January 15, 1966. 
An outcome of this coup brought into power General Aguiyi Ironsi (whose regime lasted only 
six months). The use of soldiers in civil functions such as the control of civil unrest and the 
supervision of elections may have triggered the intervention of the military in the first coup. 
The coup carried out by young dissatisfied officers from the South-East was countered on July 
25, 1966 with the murder of General Aguiyi Ironsi by Northern officers. A reason for the 
counter-coup may be seen on ethnic grounds. It is because Northern politicians seemed to 
mainly affected by the first coup conducted by the Igbo (South-East) officers. Furthermore, 
General Aguiyi Ironsi failed to prosecute the plotters of the coup and also placed Igbos in 
sensitive position in government.  
Upon the success of the counter-coup, General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner became Nigeria’s 
second head of State in 1966. However, by virtue of the first coup and its counter-coup, a 
politico-ethnic tussle had risen between the government (Northern) and the Igbos. During his 
administration, Gowon dissolved regional governance, by operating a federal system through 
the creation of 12 states. By 1975, General Gowon’s military regime was overthrown in a coup. 
This coup brought General Murtala Muhammad into office as the third military head of state, 
in post-colonial Nigeria. His regime lasted only seven months as he was killed in an 
unsuccessful coup in February 1976. Indeed historians may tag this coup unsuccessful because 
the General Dimka and other officers from middle-belt Nigeria were its center; so as to re-
instate their ‘own’ General Yakubu Gowon. Unfortunately, things turned in another direction, 
as General Olusegun Obasanjo the fourth military head of government. The Obasanjo regime 
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lasted from 1976 to 1979, when Nigeria transited to a civilian government headed by President 
Shehu Shagari.  
Shagari’s regime beginning on October 1, 1979 marked the Second Republic. Meltzer (1991) 
states a lack of co-operation between Shagari’s government and the twelve states ruled by 
opposition parties was a reflection of this political tension. The inherent political instability, a 
fraudulent second-term elections, coupled with economic problems gave General Mohammed 
Buhari enough grounds to overthrow the Shagari’s administration in 1983. 
By 1983, when General Muhammad Buhari took over government as the fifth military head of 
state, one might have been optimistic that he took the reins of power so as to stabilise the 
political economy of the nation and then transit power to a civilian government. However, the 
government over time proved incapable of salvaging the economy and also, in cause of tackling 
the now widespread corruption and accompanying indiscipline 
By 1985, General Ibrahim Babaginda took over government. He became the sixth head of State, 
Babaginda stepped-aside in 1993, handing authority to an interim head of government, Ernest 
Shonekan. However, within three months of Ernest Shonekan rule of the third republic, the 
defence minister, General Sani Abacha overthrew Shonekan’s rule. 
General Sani Abacha’s became the seventh military head of state and by 1998, General 
Abdulsalaam Abubakar took over power after his death. Abubakar was instrumental to the third 
political transition to civilian rule by May 1999. 
The fourth Republic in Nigeria, comprises the Obasanjo’s civillian rule (1999-2007), the 
President Musa Yar’Adua (2007-2010). Yar’Adua regime came to an end upon his death and 
his deputy Goodluck Jonathan took the reins of power. Since 2010 till present, Goodluck 
Jonathan remains President. 
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Below, we provide a summary of the political history of Nigeria, with emphasis on the 
respective government regimes: 
Table 3.3:  Summary of political regimes in Nigeria. 
Tenure Head of Government Number of years 
in office 
Regime type Ethnic 
origin 
Nov. 1960- Jan 1966 
Jan 1966- July 1966 
August 1966- July 1975 
July 1975- Feb 1976 
Feb 1976-Oct. 1979 
Octo 1979- Dec. 1983 
Dec. 1983-August 1985 
Aug 1985- August 1993 
Aug 1993- Nov. 1993 
Nov 1993-June 1998 
June 1998- May 1999 
May 1999- May 2007 
May 2007-May 2010 

























































Source: Author’s compilation 
3.3.3  Charactersing Nigeria’s Political System 
Stemming from the brief political history presented in the previous section, some features of 
Nigeria’s political system (with emphasis on political regimes) over the sample period 1960-
2010 are statistically characterised in this section. These features include: 
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a. Between 1960 to 2010, Nigeria has had 13 heads of governments. This implies that 
over a duration of 50 years, 13 persons have ruled Nigeria. (Refer to Table 3.3). 
Therefore, on average, political regimes have lasted for 3.85 years in Nigeria. On 
comparing with the United States, one finds that between 1961-2009, 9 presidents have 
ruled, and on average, a regime has lasted 5.33 years.  
Table 3.4: Summary of political regimes in Nigeria, compared with US 









Source: Author’s compilation 
b. Of the 13 political regimes, there have been 5 democratic regimes and 8 military 
regimes. Of this, 5 democratic regimes have lasted on average for 4.25 years, while the 
8 military regimes have lasted for 3.72 years 
Table 3.5: Summary of political regimes by regime type 







Source: Author’s compilation 
 
c. By ethnic orientation, between the time frame 1960 to 2010, 5 heads of government 
from southern region have rule Nigeria while 8 heads of government have ruled from 
the north. While the Southern leaders ruled for 16.75 years , the northern ones have 
ruled 34.25 years  
Table 3.6: Summary of political regimes by ethnic origin 
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Source: Author’s compilation 
Therefore, in this section, we derive the stylized fact that, there have been frequent changes in 
government in Nigeria. 
Stylized fact 2: Since 1960, Nigeria has experienced frequent changes in government such that: 
(a.) On the average, each head of government has ruled for 3.85 years only, compared with 
5.33 years in the United States (b.) On the average each military and civilian government have 
ruled for 3.72 and 4.25 years only, and (c.) On the average a south-led government has lasted 
3.35 years compared with 4.28 years of rule of a North-led government. 
An implication of stylized facts a-c is that every regime classification identified have lasted for 
a relatively short period in Nigeria (compared with an average of 5.33 years over similar range 
in the United States). This relatively short period of regime is interpreted as frequent changes 
in government. Because of these frequent changes, and the accompanying short regime 
duration, politicians are prone to rent-seeking activities. Furthermore, assuming every 
successive regime in the country, proposed new policy measures, these policies have on 
average 4 years to be implemented, before being abandoned. 
Directly linked to the preceding section, another statistical fact about Nigeria’s political system, 
is its weakness. This is illustrated by the World Governance Indicator, 1996-2011. Governance 
consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity 
of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among 
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them (WGI, 2012). In these, governance in Nigeria performs poorly using some indicators as 


















































































































Avg -0.84 -1.67 -1.03 -0.90 -1.26 -1.11
Source: Worldwide Governance Indictors (201) 
Using the Key: -2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance), we find that the statistical 
rating of governance in Nigeria, using this index hovers only in the negative. This is an 
indication, that on average Nigeria has a weak governance, and by implication, political system. 
Consequently, stylized fact 2 indicates that Nigeria has a weak political structure characterised 
by short durations and frequent changes in head of government. 
3.4 An overview of Nigeria’s economy (1960-2010) 
In this section, we present a statistical review of Nigeria’s economic performance since 1960, 
based on some macroeconomic variables such as Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP), 
Government Expenditure (GE), Broad Money Ratio (MS) and External debt (ED), to represent 
59 
 
critical aspects: aggregate economic activity, fiscal policy, monetary policy and external debt 
policy of the Nigerian economy. 
a. Aggregate economic activity: 
Currently, statistical facts reveal that Nigeria is a lower middle income economy (World Bank, 
2011). By statistical fact from IMF (2012), Its GDP (by PPP) in 2011 was $414.03 billion 
making it the largest economy in West Africa and the second largest economy in Africa. The 
IMF forecasts that by 2017, its GDP would have grown to become $676.254 billion. On GDP 
per capita basis, an average citizen earned $1,522.06 and it is projected to rise to $2,058.57 by 
2017. Also, the Nigerian economy is characterised by a heavy reliance on crude oil (that 
contributes about 95 per cent of exports earnings and about 70 percent to government revenue), 
Adedipe (2004) 
Since 1960, statistics show that aggregate economic activity has been on upward trend in the 
Nigerian economy. From a value of N2.4 billion in 1960, the economy grew to N4.22 billion 
in 1970, representing an average growth rate of 70 per cent. A surge in aggregate economic 




              Table 3.8: Real GDP Statistics in Nigeria  















    Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2011. 
b. Fiscal Policy: 
Government expenditure is total central government spending in a year. Statistical facts on 
fiscal policy as reflected in government spending shows that government expenditure in 
1960 was a meagre N 0.163 billion, by 1970 government spending amounted to N0.99 
billion, this increase continued such that by 1980 the amount of expenditure stood at 
N11.413 billion, in 1990, N66.58 billion. In 2000, government spending also rose to N1 
trillion and by 2011, it stood at N4.2 trillion. This upward trend indicates on the whole, an 






             Table 3.9: Government Spending Statistics in Nigeria  















Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2011 
c. Monetary Policy: 
Unlike the upward trend in aggregate economy and government expenditure, the trend 
in Broad money ratio shows both significant increases and declines. 
 
By 1970, Broad money (M2) as per cent of GDP increased from 11.98 per cent in 1960 
to 14.95. This expansion continued to 1980. Between 1980 and 1990, broad money 
contracted by about 4.13 per cent, it dipped further by 0.59 per cent, between 1990 and 
2000. By 2010, broad money ratio stood at 32.47 per cent, representing an increase of 
























Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2011. 
d. External debt Position: 
External debt measures Federal government foreign liability. A consistent increase in 
external debt figures were recorded from 1960 to 1970, from 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 
1990, 1990 to 2000. This increase was cut off between 2000 and 2010. 
Table 3.11: External debt Statistics in Nigeria 













Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2011 
Succinctly, the statistical trend in the four economic variables over the period 1960-2010 is 
shown in diagrams below: 





Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2011 
While an upward trend is recorded for the aggregate economy and total government 
expenditure figures, there are increases and declines recorded in external debt and money 
supply ratio statistics. Following this, we consider the growth rate patterns in each of these 















































Figure 3.2: Growth Patterns in RGDP, GE, MS and ED 
 
 
Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, 2011 
The growth patterns above are a preliminary evidence of possible instability in Nigeria’s 
macro-aggregates. Therefore, an overview of the Nigerian economy over the period 1960-
2010, using growth patterns in macro variables: RGDP, GE MS, and ED show an unstable 
trend, indicating likely unsatisfactory performance of the economy. 
Comparing Nigeria’s economy with other emerging economies confirms this unsatisfactory 
trend. By 1960, Nigeria was believed to be at par with Asian countries such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia and India (Sanusi, 2012). However, a look at the diagram below shows that since 







































hand, as at 1980, Indonesia was still at par with Nigeria, however since 1986, Indonesia is seen 
to continuously perform better than Nigeria (figures reported are from IMF (2012) 
Figure 3.3: GDP per capita in Nigeria versus Indonesia and Malysia (1980-2006) 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, 2012 
Stylized fact 3: An overview of Nigeria’s economy over the period 1960-2010, depicts an 
unsatisfactory performance. 
So far, re-iterating the stylized facts shows that: 
1. There is a plausible positive correlation between politics and economic outcomes 
2. Nigeria political system is marred by frequent changes in government and a weak 
governance (political) institution. 
3. An overview of Nigeria’s economy over the period 1960-2010, depicts an 
unsatisfactory performance 
Linking stylized facts 1 to 3 together shows that: if there is a positive correlation between 
politics and economics outcomes, such that politics induces economic outcomes, then the weak 
and frequently changing political institution of Nigeria is likely to explain the unsatisfactory 

































































This proposition is confirmed using the correlation analysis (cue taken from Verspagen, 
(2012)). If political factors induce macroeconomic outcomes, we expect to find a positive 
correlation between politics and economic outcomes in the correlation matrix. 
Therefore a correlation analysis between politics and economic outcomes (RGDP, GE, MS and 
ED) is carried out. A political dummy called DUMP is constructed. It captures the various 
political regimes such that years in which a regime changes is denoted by 1 and elsewhere, 0.  












Source: Author’s compilation 
As expected, there was positive correlation between DUMP and RGDP, GE, MS except ED. 
The positive correlation is a preliminary proof of speculations that politics influences the 
outcomes of economic aggregates in Nigeria, such that the state of politics reflects in the state 
of the economy. However, this correlation is weak. We re-write stylized fact 1 as there is a 
positive correlation between politics and economic outcomes in Nigeria, such that a causal 
relation from politics to economic outcomes exists in Nigeria. 
Stylized fact 4: There is a positive correlation between politics and economic outcomes in 
Nigeria, such that a causal relation from politics to economic outcomes exists in Nigeria. 
3.5 Characterising the Political Economy of Nigeria 
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In the preceding section, preliminary evidence that politics determines economic outcomes in 
Nigeria was presented. In this stand-alone section, we compare how the relevant economic 
variables-RGDP, GE, MS and ED has fared across successive political regimes since 1960. 
Table 3.13: Economic Performance across Political Regimes 
Source: Author’s Compilation 
From the table, the asterisk figures are economic outcome above the total average values for 
each of the economic variables. We considered the growth patterns in each of the variable 
above, across several political regimes. 
With an average growth of N15476.9 million in the aggregate economy, only Shagari, 
Obasanjo civilian and Yar’Adua regimes were above the average. Of the three regimes, 
Statistics showed that the economy grew best under the Yar’Adua’s regime. On the other hand, 
the economy grew least under Azikwe/Ironsi regimes. 
3.6   Summary and Conclusion 





















































The main findings from this chapter are the following stylized facts: 
1. There is a plausible positive correlation between politics and economic outcomes 
2. Nigeria political system is marred by frequent changes in government and a weak 
governance (political) institution. 
3. An overview of Nigeria’s economy over the period 1960-2010, depicts an 
unsatisfactory performance 
4. There is a positive correlation between politics and economic outcomes in Nigeria, such 
that a causal relation from politics to economic outcomes exists in Nigeria. 
Thus, the preliminary evidence favouring the assertion that politics influences economic 
outcomes is good ground on which to hypothesize that politically-induced economic 













THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHOD 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, the theoretical base of this study and the estimation strategy to address its 
primary objectives are outlined. In line, this Chapter has been divided into three sections. After 
the introductory part in section 4.1, section 4.2 discusses the theoretical framework used in this 
thesis. Existing Political business cycle theories are also outlined and the most relevant to 
Nigeria, chosen. Section 4.3 presents the relevant estimation strategy. This section comprises 
the model specification and univariate de-trending method of time series used. Then, applicable 
estimation techniques are stated. Two estimation techniques: Univariate and Multivariate will 
be used to find evidence for politically-induced fluctuations. Thereafter, the data sources and 
measurement is listed.  
4.2 Theoretical Framework 
In defining the theoretical base of this work, existing theories of political business cycle are 
first presented and then evaluated in the context of Nigeria. From the evaluation made, the most 
relevant theory is selected. 
Historically, the idea of political business cycles originated from the work of Kalecki (1943) 
in his paper ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment.’ In it, Kalecki (1943) speculated emergence 
of a business cycle because politicians were subject to conflicting pressures arising from (high-
income) business class individuals who were adverse to full employment but favoured 
contracting economic policies and on the other hand, (low and middle-income) working class 
individuals who favoured expansionary economic measures 
Also providing the philosophical base on which subsequent theoretical constructs were to stand 
was Downs (1957). In his work ‘An Economic Theory of Democracy’, Downs demonstrated 
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the Median Voter theorem that says in a two-party system, the policies of political parties tend 
to converge such that both parties follow the same policy when in office. A reason for this 
policy convergence outcome is that irrespective of the diverse ideological stance of the two 
rival parties, their underlying intention to win elections compels them to pursue the same 
policies.  
Currently, Political business cycle theories although diverse, can be classified along two lines. 
The first being the Opportunistic-Partisan Strand and the other, based on the rationality or not 
of Voters. Classifying Political cycle models using these two frameworks result into four major 
types of models: Opportunistic model, Partisan model, Rational Opportunistic model and 
Rational Partisan model. In the next sub-section, these models are discussed. 
4.2.1 Political Business Cycle Models 
a. Opportunistic Political Cycle Model 
This model stems mainly from the work of Nordhaus (1975) in his paper ‘The Political 
Business Cycle’. The core idea of Nordhaus (1975) is that an office-motivated politician, in a 
bid to get re-elected, manipulates economic policies to woo voters. Therefore, prior to elections 
such a politician creates expansionary economic outcomes (which voters prefer) and in the 
period following elections, since he has won, implements contractionary economic policies. 
Nordhaus presents an economy with only two agents: the politicians and individuals (voters). 
The macroeconomic structure is typified as having an exploitable Philips curve. A Philip curve 
demonstrates a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Drazen2 (undated) depicts this 
economy as  





Where the difference between actual unemployment (𝑈 ) and natural unemployment 
(𝑈  equals the difference between actual and expected inflation 
In this exploitable Philips curve economy, the aim of a Politician/Policymaker is to increase 
his likelihood of re-election. To achieve this aim, the politician possesses two policy options: 
either induce unemployment or induce inflation. Then, to maximize his re-election chances, a 
politician must be wary of voters’ preferences. For example, Nordhaus (1975) characterise 
voters’ preferences as: 
“These individuals have the aggregate 
unemployment and inflation rates in their 
preference functions and that individuals prefer 
stable prices and low unemployment rates and 
are averse to high inflation and unemployment 
rates”  
Nordhaus (1975) also assumes that although individual voters are rational in their preferences, 
they are however, unlearned or ignorant about economic performance. Because of this 
ignorance, Voters cannot judge the competence of the politician on their own, but must fall 
back on comparing how well this politician has in the past satisfied their preference. 
Thus, in making political decisions, voters retrospectively gauge the performance of incumbent 
politicians. Nordhaus (1975) also assumed that voters have decaying short memory such that 
voters only remember the most recent outcomes of the economy. Because of this, an 
opportunistic incumbent politician resorts to fine-tuning the economy just before election, so 




In the end, an opportunistic politician is successful at fooling voters with expansionary policies 
before elections (which is to reduce unemployment) and consequently, after elections, in a bid 
to combat resulting inflation, contracts the economy.  
Finally, voters are assumed to form a backward looking expectation of government’s policy so 
that they cannot predict it. The backward looking nature of voter’s expectation is of the form: 
𝜋  𝜋  𝛼 𝜋 𝜋           (2) 
Where ∝∶ speed with which expected inflation (𝜋 ) adapts to past expected error. 0 𝛼   1 
Thus, under this framework, an economy cycles when in the next election period, the same 
trend of expansionary and contraction policy measures take place. 
Notable criticisms of the Nordhaus (1975) model include: First, the assumption that 
government or incumbent politician controls monetary policy is regarded as inconsistent with 
reality. This is because in this model, politicians are proposed to use monetary policy to induce 
inflation or not. This idea negates the notion of an independent Central Bank. Second, arising 
from the advent of the rational hypothesis of the New Classical in the 1970s, voters are argued 
not to be backward looking, but forward looking individuals. 
Applying the opportunistic political cycle model, especially to the case of developing countries 
raises the following issues: 
i. Nordhaus (1975)’s economic structure is embedded in a fully-developed stylized 
democratic society. However, fully-developed democracies are most obtainable in 
industrialized societies. On the contrary, many developing countries either possess a 
nascent democracy or authoritarian regimes. Then, the question that arises is, how 




To answer this, one discovers that on one hand, these models are somewhat realistic in 
developing countries since manipulative politicians as described in Nordhaus model exist in 
these countries. For example, (Block et al, (2003)) point that incumbents in SSA have access 
to large discretion in decision making. In a weak political institution as characterised by 
Acemoglu et al (2002), having a large discretion means that, politicians face no constraint 
(checks and balances) on their decision making power such that when they have vested self-
interest, these incumbent politicians can afford to manipulate economic policies.  
On the other hand, one is liable to argue that Politicians in developing countries (especially in 
authoritarian regimes) may not need to manipulate economic policies to be re-elected. This is 
in light of fact that politicians in these countries do not require electorates’ votes to be elected, 
since they enforce themselves on the electorate. For instance, if Nigeria’s incumbent politician 
and political party (in 2003 and 2007) were opportunistic in the sense of Nordhaus (1975), then 
rigging may not have occurred, as the incumbent will only resort to manipulate economic 
policies. In a country report on Nigeria, Polity IV (2010) notes that in the April 2003 
presidential elections, Local and international observers, while unwilling to call the elections 
fraudulent, nevertheless, noted serious breaches of the electoral process; Also, Polity IV (2010) 
notes that elections were seriously marred by improprieties by the PDP-controlled government 
in the 2007 presidential elections. 
 
 
b. Partisan Political Cycle models: 
Coming from another perspective, Partisan models propose that ideologies are the driving 
impulse to politically-induced cycles. This model originated from the work of Douglas Hibbs 
(1977), as he sought to establish post-war patterns in macroeconomic policies and outcomes in 
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capitalist democracies such as the United States and Britain; and found that indeed: 
“government pursue macroeconomic policies broadly in accordance with the objective 
economic interests and subjective preferences of their class-defined core political 
constituencies.”  
According to this model, Politicians have two underlying leanings- left or right. Left wing 
politicians affiliate with low income workers and tend to pursue expansionary policy in order 
to reduce unemployment. On the other hand, right wing politicians associate with high income 
entrepreneurs who choose low inflation and high unemployment outcomes.  In the end, 
politicians are assumed to induce macroeconomic fluctuates as power changes between a left 
and right politician.  
More formally, Hibbs (1977) model presents politicians and voters in an expectation-
augmented or exploitable Philip curve economy. 
𝑈  𝑈  𝜋  𝜋          (1) 
Where voters judge economic performance of political parties based on the rate of 
unemployment and inflation in the form: 
          𝐿 𝑈 , 𝜋    + 𝜃          (2) 
Where  𝜋 : Party j’s target rate of inflation 
            𝑈 : Party j’s target unemployment rate 
 𝜃  : The weight party j puts on deviation of actual inflation from target inflation relative 
to deviation of actual unemployment from target 
The two parties, say a right-wing party R and a left-wing party L, are characterized by: 
 𝜃   𝜃   ;     𝜋    𝜋   ;    𝑈       𝑈  
Furthermore, voters also form backward expectation of government intervention of the form 
75 
 
𝜋  𝜋  𝛼 𝜋 𝜋          (3) 
Where 𝛼: speed with which expected inflation (𝜋 ) adapts to past expected error. 0  𝛼   1 
The above equations are worked out so that cycle occurs when the level of economic activity 
and inflation varies with the ideology of the incumbent. 
 
In similitude with drawbacks in the Nordhaus (1975) Opportunistic model, the Partisan Model 
assumes that voters form adaptive expectation of economic performance. Also, government’s 
management of monetary policy contradicts the idea of an independent Central Bank. 
Furthermore, applying Hibbs (1977) partisan model to developing countries reveals that: 
Politician’s ideology division into left and right policy leanings largely suits well-developed 
democratic economies. Schuknecht (1996) as cited from Kaplan (2006) opines the difficulty 
with extending the right-left concept to developing countries because party distinctions do not 
always exhibit the standard right-left ideological differences frequently found in developed 
countries., in developing countries as Nigeria, the left-right political split is difficult to define. 
A reason is that rather than this left-right ideology divide, Nigeria’s politics is deeply-
entrenched in ethnic fragmentation. Collier (2008) supports this by stating that many 
developing countries, especially in Africa, are highly ethnically diverse and these sub-national 
identities trump the relatively recent introduction of national identities.  
Rational-based Political business cycle models 
The emergence of the New Classical Rational hypothesis in the 1970s made impracticable 
Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) assumption of a backward looking voter with adaptive 
expectation. Rationality of voters and even politicians were invariably introduced into existing 
political cycle models. These rational-based models include: Rational Opportunistic model and 
Rational Partisan Model. They are explained in the next subsection 
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c. Rational Opportunistic Models 
These models were pioneered by Rogoff and Sibert (1986); Rogoff (1990); Persson and 
Tabellini (1990). They are also termed ‘political budget cycle.’ The rational opportunistic 
models maintain the central assumptions of the traditional opportunistic model. However, it 
differs based on the ground that individual voters form expectations in a forward looking 
manner. 
In defending the Rational Opportunistic Model, Rogoff and Sibert (1986) asserts that while 
electoral cycles arise from manipulating economic policies (based on voter’s naiveness) in the 
traditional strands, in the Rational Opportunistic models, electoral cycles arise from temporal 
information asymmetry. 
The temporal information asymmetry is such that a forward looking voter relies on the 
competence of an incumbent, in making his voting decision. Competence, according to Rogoff 
and Sibert (1986), is reflected in the administrative ability of incumbent and in the success of 
policies to provide government services efficiently. Since competence is not a directly 
observable attribute, voters utilize the performance of the economy to measure the competence 
of an incumbent politician. For instance, when economic outcomes are positive, this signals to 
voters that the incumbent is competent. 
To be re-elected, prior to election, the incumbent tries to signal competent in order to convince 
voters of better economic outcomes under him, than his opponent. Furthermore, the model 
assumes that competency is persistent with a lag. 
For example, in order to indicate competency, incumbent politicians use fiscal policy to induce 
high economic activity before elections. One such way is to increase consumption spending on 
visible budgetary items such as increase in transfers and reduction of taxes amongst others over 
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investment spending just before election and thereafter return to normalcy (investment 
spending exceeding consumption) after election. 
d. Rational Partisan Models 
The Rational Partisan model is an extension to the traditional Partisan model. This model was 
proposed by Alesina (1987). In it, Alesina (1987) suggests that in addition to political 
ideological differences, uncertainty about election outcomes trigger economic fluctuations. In 
the same vein, Alesina and Sachs (1986) emphasize that ‘only unexpected policy matter’. To 
them, uncertainty about election outcome means voters cannot predict the party (left wing or 
right wing) that will win the next election. 
Since voters cannot predict the winner of an election, they form expectations of future policy 
based on the average of the expected policies of the two competing parties. However, if a left 
(right) wing party with expansionary (contractionary) monetary policy wins the election, since 
this is unexpected, there will be a fall (rise) in unemployment after the election.  
Furthermore, the model opines that in the first part of a politician or party’s tenure in office, 
each party (left or right) follow an expansionary or a contractionary policy respectively. But in 
second part of their tenures, both left and right wing policies soon converge. The re-election 
motive of both parties creates this policy convergence. By asserting that policy converges for 
the purpose of re-election, Alesina’s Rational Partisan model is sometimes classified as being 
opportunistic-partisan in nature 
Following the brief review of the Rational opportunistic and Partisan Models respectively, one 
central critique of the rational-based models come from Nordhaus (1989). Upon empirical 
testing of the concept, he finds no evidence of rational voters. He captions this as the 
‘honeymoon effect.’ This refers to the idea newly elected politicians enjoy high popularity at 
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the beginning of their tenure, but over time, this high popularity dwindles because voters had 
unrealistic expectations of the politician. 
e. Context-based models: 
In practice, using a distinct PBC model to capture politically induced cycles may be inadequate. 
Therefore, features of both partisan and opportunistic PBC models can be combined for more 
valid and context-relevant theoretical constructs. Tiganas and Peptine (undated) refer to these 
as Context-dependent models. Tiganas and Peptine (undated) highlight the work of Frey and 
Schneider (1978) who present a mix of both partisan and opportunistic PBC models. According 
to them, Frey and Schneider (1978) argue that partisan incumbents can be opportunistic before 
elections depending on the popularity of such incumbent. 
Yet another classification of context-based PBC models exists. These are ad hoc models 
developed to capture the peculiarity of the country under study. For example, Li (2011) 
developed a three-period PBC model capturing the institutional features of China, while 
Bloomberg and Hess (2000) introduce a political variable into a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model and Maloney et al (2002) develop a dynamic version of the Rational Partisan 
model. These models, although replicable, are most often relevant in the context of work done 
only. 
4.2.2 Applying Political business cycle theories in Nigeria’s context 
In the quote below, Drazen (2006) shows the appropriateness of existing Political business 
cycle (PBC) theories to cases of developing countries as Nigeria. 
“...the same political economy is relevant for developing and 
developed economies...The most important policy questions may 
be different, as may be the choice of models in terms of what 
issues, choice mechanisms, or constraints should be stressed. 
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However, the general theoretical framework that is used to study 
issues in developed countries is relevant in developing countries 
as are the methodological approaches and the key building blocks 
of the analysis.” 
 
Therefore, irrespective of Nigeria’s political institutional differences from those of developed 
countries, existing PBC theories are applicable to her. However, in applying the existing PBC 
theories, some of their assumptions have to be relaxed. 
 
Of the five PBC theories listed above, this study finds Hibbs (1977) Partisan Model, most 
relevant to testing Political cycles in Nigeria, with an authoritarian-democratic framework.  
 
The relevance of the Partisan Model in defining Nigeria’s political economy is depicted below: 
“The political system in Nigeria is characterised by the concentration 
of power in the executive, and in particular the President and State 
governors. Other institutions of government, including the 
legislature, judiciary and civil service, have limited influence and 
capacity... In this context many policy decisions are taken personally 
by the President often in response to active lobbying from 
individuals and interest groups. This has resulted in a shifting and 
unpredictable policy environment that benefits certain interest 
groups, and can lead to vigorous change, but does not provide a 
coherent stable and predictable basis for investment and broad-
based, private sector-led growth” (Utomi, Duncan and Williams, 
2007).  
 
From the quote above, one discovers that: 
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a. Policy Choices are largely influenced by personal ideologies of heads of government 
in Nigeria: 
In countries with weak political institutions as Nigeria, where citizens are not actively engaged 
in the political process, and where elected officials are not responsive to the elements of 
governance (Natufe, 2006 paraphrased); and where checks and balances on government 
discretion are absent (Acemoglu et al, 2002), policy formulation is likely to be individualized, 
without recourse to formal institutions (such as citizen participation) 
 
The facts that citizens’ participation in political process is low and that, policy formulation is 
very likely to be individualized, is captured by the World Governance Indicator. This indicator 
rates six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of 
Corruption. In this context, we focus on Voice and Accountability that measures the extent to 
which citizens in a country participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and free media (overall citizen participation); and on 
Control of corruption that shows the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain 
and ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests (how policy formulation are 
personalised for private gain). 
 
The percentile ranks for the period 1996-2011 reveal that Nigeria ranks between 0 and 45 
percentile for voice and accountability and between 0 and 35 percentile for Control of 
corruption, using a Percentile score that ranks worse governance lower and allots higher values 
to better governance. This confirms the exclusion of citizens in political decision making and 





b. Interest groups especially ethnic-based ones, largely influence Policy choices in 
Nigeria: 
In a multifaceted, ethnically-diverse society as Nigeria, political decision processes are ethnic-
based struggles over redistribution of national resources. With over 250 ethnic groups and a 
post-colonial history of factional political conflict, the most intense ethnic divisions have 
historically revolved around the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbos, and the Yorubas. Moreover, the core 
division within the Nigerian polity over the past forty years pits the politically dominant 
Muslim states of the north against the economically advantaged “Christian” south (Polity IV, 
2010). Inherent ethnic fragmentation has birthed political patronage in Nigeria. For instance, 
Utomi, Duncan and Williams (2007) opines that past leaders have used ethnicity as an easy 
tactic to mobilise support, and have then come under pressure to corner a share of national 
resources for their people (ethnic constituency). With deep-seated ethnic divisions, it becomes 
difficult for politicians and political parties to develop conventional left-right political 
ideologies. 
Based on the discussions above, this study adapts Hibbs (1977) Partisan model, albeit relaxing 
the following assumptions: 
1. Just as Hibbs (1977), this study assumes that political preferences of incumbent are 
the driving impulse of economic fluctuations. However, 
2. In Hibbs (1977), politician’s ideology derives from the policy preferences of 
politician’s political parties. Instead, this study adapts this assumption to Nigeria by 
proposing that incumbent Politician’s ideology derive from his personal preference. 
3. While Hibbs (1977) classifies policy preferences of politicians along a left-right policy 
dimension. This study characterises the ideology of past heads of government   by a. 
Ethnic background b. Political regime type  c. Economic Policy thrust 
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4. While Hibbs (1977) assumes a well-developed democratic institution, we relax this 
assumption based on the fact that Nigeria has had a mix of authoritarian and nascent 
democratic regimes over time. 
5. In applying the Hibbs (1977) partisan model, one must take note of rationality of voters 
in Nigeria. Taking a cue from the poor rating of Nigeria in the Voice and 
Accountability index of the World Governance Indicator, one may conclude that voters 
are excluded from selecting their government and in policy decision making process. 
Then, on average, voters can be inferred to be just as naive as voters in Hibbs (1977) 
partisan model.  
4.3 Research Methods 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
In line with the first objective of this study, the existence of political cycles is tested using an 
atheoretical method. The atheoretical method specifies a model with little or no recourse to 
economic theory. Despite this, we find the theoretical framework (section 4.2.3) useful at 
defining the macroeconomic and political variables to be specified in the study’s model.  
In actual testing of politically-induced fluctuations, the empirical norm is to select relevant 
macroeconomic variables. The economic variables selected are used to represent the macro 
economy of Nigeria, and are classified as either policy variables or aggregate macroeconomic 
outcomes. Once selected, the presence of politically-induced cycles is then tested using the 
time series data of each variable. In this study, the variables: Real Gross Domestic Product 
(RGDP), Government Expenditure (GE), Broad Money Supply (MS) and External Debt (ED) 
are used. By employing these variables, the implication is that political cycles are tested in both 
macroeconomic outcomes (RGDP) and in macroeconomic policy variables (GE, MS and ED). 
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Then, the model specified takes the form where macroeconomic variables (RGDP, GE, MS 
and ED) is assumed to be a linear function of past lagged value of itself and intervention 
political dummies, respectively.  
With both macroeconomic variables and political dummies, this study estimates a model in a 
Univariate ARMAX (p,q) form. The ARMAX framework is selected in this work, because of 
the intuition that as political regime changes, structural breaks are created in the economy. 
Then, the ARMAX model is liable to identify any structural changes in economic series data 
as a result of this political change, as it assumes that mean shifts in time series are generated 
by a noise model and exogenous variables. The ARMAX method used stems from Hibbs 
(1977). However, our model differs from Hibbs (1977) due to the number of economic series 
used. While Hibbs (1977) test political cycle in unemployment data, we test political cycles 
using RGDP, GE, MS and ED such that: 
 
 
𝑌  𝜃  𝛼 𝑌 ∑ 𝜏 𝑃    𝛽 𝜀                  (4.1) 






           𝑌 :   lag order of Autoregressive terms  
           𝑃 :      Exogenous Political Variables 
           𝜀 :   lag order of Moving Averages  
           𝜃:        Constant term 
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           𝛼 :      Parameter of AR (p) process 
 𝛽  :     Parameter of MA (q) process 
 𝜏:       Parameters showing the effect of a shift in political variables on 𝑌  
Apriori expectation: 𝜏 should be statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
Other underlying assumptions of the model are: First, the 4 by 1 vector of 𝑌  are cyclical 
components and these dependent variables are weakly stationary. In ARMAX modelling, the 
stationary criteria must be met so that estimated parameters are stable and well-behaved. 
 In addition, the Exogenous Political variables 𝑃  are assumed to be intervention variables that 
induce changes in the endogenous time series. Ideally, intervention variables are represented 
as dummies. In this study, 𝑃  is a vector of 4 political dummies- DUMP, DUME, DUMR and 
DUMI. These variables (to be defined later) are used to characterise the various forms of 
political ideologies in Nigeria (as identified in the theoretical framework: ethnic, political 
regime type and economic policy thrust). This study opines that changes in these political 
dummies variables induce fluctuations in the dependent variable.  
In testing the second objective of this thesis: characterise the business cycle properties of 
political cycles, we use a multivariate method called the dynamic factor model. This model is 
premised on the notion that the dependent variables (RGDP, GE, MS and ED) are jointly 
generated by an unobserved dynamic factor.  
In the context of this work, we estimate a dynamic factor model where: 
𝑌   𝛼 𝐿 𝑓   𝑒                      (4.2) 




𝑌    …   𝑒   
𝑖 1, … , 4  and  𝑡 1, … , 𝑛  
𝑌  : 4 by 1 vector of observable time series, comprising RGDP, GE, MS and ED  
𝑓  : Unobserved dynamic factor, AVDUM 
𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 : Stochastic error term  
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) are assumed to be stationary processes and (𝑒  and 𝑣 are assumed to 
be Gaussian). 
Upon estimation of equations (4.2) and (4.3), a one-step-ahead forecast of 𝑓  is estimated. These 
forecasts of 𝑓  are the underlying political shocks, identified by AVDUM. AVDUM is a 
composite variable, comprising the average of the 4 dummies used in model (4.1). 
4.3.2 Estimation Techniques 
In estimating the models specified above, a series of procedures are used. In this section, 
procedures for estimating the univariate and multivariate models are respectively presented. 
However on the whole, the estimation strategy is: First, extract cyclical component of required 
macroeconomic variable; then, apply both the ARIMA and Dynamic Factor Models to estimate 
the model, afterwards, extract political shocks using the dynamic factor models and finally, 
characterise the business cycle properties of this political shocks. These are expounded below: 
a) De-trending Method 
There are four components in a time series: Trend, seasonal, cyclical and irregular. Then, it is 
worthwhile to extract cyclical components from each macroeconomic time series employed in 
this work, since the study is concerned with macroeconomic fluctuations. Formal statistical 
tools used in extracting cyclical components from a time series are called de-trending methods. 
These methods range from unit root first differencing of a series, to the Hodrick-Prescott, 
Baxter and King Filters, among others. 
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Of these methods, Hodrick-Prescott (1980) Filter is a Univariate technique applied to extract 
the cyclical components of RGDP, GE, MS and ED. This Filter is regarded as a most commonly 
used de-trending technique because of its simplicity. The Hodrick-Prescott filter estimates 
trend by smoothing – in effect, by taking a weighted moving average of the original series, 
where the moving average is symmetric and centred (French (2001). It is a high pass filter that 
eliminates low frequency variation in a series. 
 
HP framework can be mathematically illustrated as assuming a time series  , 
that comprises a trend component (𝜏  ) and a cyclical one ( 𝐶 ). The aim is to minimize equation 
(4.4) below with respect to the trend component (𝜏  ). 
            (4.4) 
Where  𝐶 : 𝑦 𝜏  is sum of squared deviation representing the deviation from trend and is the 
cyclical component 
 𝜆 : penalizes fluctuation in second differences of the trend component 
French (2001) notes that the HP filter is optimal for cases when is known to have an I(2) trend 
and Second, the H-P filter is optimal only if the cycle consists of white noise or if the identical 
dynamic mechanism propagates changes in the trend growth rate and in the innovations to the 
business cycle component. Despite these drawbacks, the advantage of the HP method is its 
simplicity, because it uses the same method to extract trend from a set of variables. 
 
In applying the HP Filter in this work, each individual time series are logged and then HP-
filtered. In the end, cyclical components of RGDP, GE, MS and ED are extracted. 
 
b) Univariate ARMAX Modelling 
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In this stage, the extracted cyclical data of RGDP, GE, MS and ED are fitted to an 
Autoregressive Moving Average model with exogenous variables. The ARMAX (p, q) model 
is an extension of the Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) process with other time series 
as input variables. More succinctly, a variable 𝑌  follows an ARMAX process if it is generated 
by past lagged values of itself, input variables and stochastic error terms. The input variables 







Following this, ARMA model with exogenous variables can be specified as: 
𝑌 𝑤  𝐼  𝑁                                                                                                             (4.5) 
Where,  
𝑌 :        Dependent variable 
𝑓 𝐼 :  Intervention component (Exogenous variable(s)) 
𝑁 :       Noise component (ARMA structure) 
𝑤 :       Parameter of Intervention component 
Note: Equation (4.5) is specified to illustrate the actual form of ARMAX (intervention models). 
Equation (4.1) derives from this framework. 
 
The next task is to fit cyclically-derived macroeconomic data to equation (4.1) using the Box-
Jenkins procedure. This procedure is an iterative one evolving in four stages: identification, 




i. Identification:  
Since ARMAX (p, q) are atheoretical models, then it behoves us to find the appropriate ARMA 
process by which our ARMAX (p, q) model were generated. At this stage, the appropriate 
values of p and q are determined using an autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function. 
The autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function are plots of the 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation as a function of lags. The patterns of spikes or lags 
in these functions are understudied to arrive at the appropriate value for p and q. The table 




Table 4.1: Patterns of ACF and PACF 
Process ACF PACF 
AR(1): 𝒂𝟏 > 0 
AR(1): 𝒂𝟏 < 0 
AR (p) 
 
MA (1): 𝜷 𝟎 
 
MA (1): 𝜷 𝟎 
 
ARMA (1,1) 
𝒂𝟏 > 0 
ARMA (1,1) 
𝒂𝟏 < 0 
Direct geometric decay: 𝜌 = 𝑎  
Oscillatory decay:          𝜌 = 𝑎  
Decays toward zero. Coefficients may 
oscillate 
Positive spike at lag 1. 𝜌 = 0 for 
 s 2 
Negative spike at lag 1. . 𝜌 = 0 for 
 s 2 
Geometric decay beginning after lag 
1. Sign 𝜌  sign (𝑎  𝛽) 
Oscillating decay beginning after lag 
1. Sign 𝜌  sign (𝑎 𝛽) 
∅ 𝜌 ; ∅ = 0 for s  2 
∅ 𝜌 ; ∅ = 0 for s  2 
Spikes through lag p. All ∅ = 0 
for s > p 
Oscillatory decay: ∅ 0 
 
Geometric decay: ∅ 0 
 
Oscillating decay after lag 1. 
∅ 𝜌  
Geometric decay beginning after 








Decay (either direct or oscillatory) 
beginning after lag q 
sign ( ∅ ) 
Decay (either direct or 
oscillatory) beginning after lag p 
 
Source: Enders (2010) 
Note: ACF: Autocorrelation Function      PACF: Partial Autocorrelation Function 
As a chip-in, underlying time series variables (RGDP, GE, MS and ED) should be tested for 
stationarity. This is based on the premise that time series are weakly stationary in an ARMA 
model because the distribution theory underlying the use of sample ACF and PACF as 
approximation to those of the true data-generating process assumes the time series is stationary, 
Enders (2010). When weakly stationary, variables are said to possess a constant mean, variance 
and covariance over time. This study employs the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Philip Perron 
Unit root tests in testing for stationarity in time series. Both methods test a null hypothesis that 
there is a unit root. While the ADF is parametric, the PP is non-parametric. Upon estimating, 
if the test-statistics of both methods are compared with the critical values at 1, 5 and 10 per 
cent respectively and is less, then we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that no unit root 
exists and vice-versa. 
ii. Estimation:  
Once the appropriate order of p and q has been determined, then the parameters of the newly 
determined ARMAX model are estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Estimator. The 
estimated parameters of the ARMAX (especially intervention) model are expected to be 
statistically different from zero. In the context of this work, the statistical significance of 
parameters of the political exogenous variables is of primary importance. If these variables are 
significant, then political cycles are detected. 
iii. Diagnostic Checking: 
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In this stage, the likelihood that the estimated ARMAX model is a reasonable good fit to RGDP, 
GE, MS and ED data is tested. This stage requires that the residuals from the estimated models 
are white-noise. Upon evidence that the residuals are white-noise, the estimated model is 
judged adequate. 
The criteria used to specify that residuals are white noise are that: 
a. The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation function of residuals is tested on 
ground that its lags are statistically equal to zero (i.e 𝜌 0) and that its 
residuals are serially uncorrelated 
b. The Portmanteau Q-test statistic produces a value where its p-value are 
statistically equal to zero (i.e: insignificant)  
 
Nonetheless, it is not uncommon to discover several plausible models for a single time series. 
In this case, the best model within the ‘class of good models’ are selected with recourse to the 
Akaike Information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The most 
parsimonious model is one with the lowest value of AIC and BIC. 
 
It is worth mentioning that an advantage of the ARIMA method is its simplicity, nevertheless, 
it is based on the assumption that no feedback or causal relationship exists among variables in 
an economic system. In reality, this does not hold, for in any economy, several variables are 
interdependent with feedback interaction among them. In order to model this assumption of an 
economy, we turn to a multivariate framework. 
 
c) Dynamic Factor Models 
In reality, economic variables are not just determined by past lags of themselves, but also by 
interaction with other variables and their past lags. To account for the dynamics amongst 
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several macroeconomic variables, Multivariate frameworks such as the Vector Autoregressive 
Model by Christopher Sims (1980) was proposed.  
In the context of political cycle studies, numerous studies consider the existence of political 
cycles in a univariate system. This attempt is likely to underestimate the true magnitude of 
political cycle fluctuations. Therefore, multivariate analysis is essential to help capture 
simultaneously, political cycle fluctuations in several macroeconomic variables. An attempt to 
use a multivariate technique was by Faust and Irons (1999), who used a VAR technique. 
However, Gujarati (2010) opines that co-efficients in a VAR models are difficult to interpret.  
This study proposes the use of dynamic factor models. Just as the VAR models, dynamic factor 
models are multivariate time series techniques. The model assumes that co-movement or 
variability in several macroeconomic series can be largely explained by unobservable or state 
factor(s). 
More formally, the premise of a dynamic factor model is that a few latent dynamic factors, 𝑓  
drives the co-movement of a high dimensional vector of time-series variables,𝑋 , which is also 
affected by a vector of mean-zero idiosyncratic disturbances 𝑒  (Stock and Watson, 2010). The 
dynamic factor model is presented as: 
𝑋   𝛼 𝐿 𝑓   𝑒                     (4.6) 
𝑓  𝛽 𝐿 𝑓  𝑣                              (4.7) 
Where: 
𝑋    …   𝑒   
𝑖 1, … , 𝑚  and  𝑡 1, … , 𝑛  
𝑋  : N by 1 vector of observable time series, if there are N series 
𝑒  : N by 1 vector of stochastic error terms 
𝑓  : q by 1 vector of unobserved dynamic factors, if there are q dynamic factors 
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𝑣 : q by 1 vector of stochastic error terms 
Equations (4.6) and (4.7) are assumed to be stationary processes and (𝑒  and 𝑣 are assumed to 
be Gaussian). 
To estimate equations (4.6) and (4.7), Stock and Watson (2010) proffer three methods: 
a. The Gaussian Maximum Likelihood estimation and the Kalman Filter; 
b. A non parametric estimation method using cross-sectional averaging; and 
c. Using consistent non-parametric estimates of the factors to estimated parameters of the 
state-space model. 
In this study, the Gaussian Maximum Likelihood (ML) and Kalman Filter method is preferred 
to estimate the dynamic factor model used. An advantage of this method is that it provides 
optimal estimate of factor and it produces consistent parameters, even in the face of irregular 
and missing data. However, the model is limited by a dimensionality problem; this is such that 
the ML and Kalman Filter accommodate small series only. This restricts the number of series 
that can be estimated. Furthermore, the dimensionality problem constrains one to estimate a 
model where the number of observable time series, 𝑋  is strictly greater than that of the 
unobserved dynamic factors, 𝑓 . 
 
In direct comparism with the Univariate ARIMA model, the dynamic factor model as a 
multivariate method is expected to produce better fit in sample. 
4.3.3 Data Source and Measurement 
Once again, the atheoretical methods used in this study assumes that economic time series are 
a linear function of past lags of these series and of four intervention political dummies in the 
case of the univariate model. For the multivariate model, it is assumed that economic time 
series in a feedback system are a linear function of an unobserved factor. The unobserved factor 
is identified by a composite political dummy. We note that we were constrained to use a 
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composite dummy to deal with the dimensionality problem in the estimation of the dynamic 
factor model. 
 
Furthermore, the variables used in this work are annual frequency, derived from Central Bank 
Statistical Bulletin, 2011. The variables are: 
Table 4.2: Description of Data 
Variable          Description   Measurement 
 





Real Gross Domestic Product 
Total Government Expenditure 
Money Supply ratio (M2/GDP) 
External Debt 
N’ Million            
N’ Million            
Ratio                     
N’ Million            
CCBN Stat. Bulletin 
CCBN Stat. Bulletin 
CCBN Stat. Bulletin 
CCBN Stat. Bulletin 
 
The political dummies employed in this study, derive from the forms of political ideology 
identified in section 4.2.3 (theoretical framework), they are defined as: 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝 : Political dummy defining period in which a head of government was in office 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑒 : Political regime dummy defining the ethnic origin of head of government 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑟 : Political regime dummy defining if government was military or civilian 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖 : Political regime dummy defining the economic policy thrust of government 
DUMP Dump= 0: Years when heads of government did not change 
Dump= 1: Years when heads of government change 
DUME Dume= 0: Years when the head of government was a Northerner 
Dume= 1: Years when head of government was a Southerner 
DUMR Dumr=  0: Years when head of government was military 
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Dumr= 1: Years when head of government was civilian 
DUMI Dumi= +1: Years when an expansionary government was in place 
Dumi= -1: Years when a contraction government was in place 
AVDUM* Composite dummy derived from average of the four dummies above. It is used 










ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION 
5.1 Introduction 
In line with the main objective of this study, empirical evidence of political cycles (i.e: evidence 
of political regimes as sources of business cycle fluctuation) in Nigeria, over the timeframe 
1960-2010, is tested. Consequently, this chapter provides the requisite empirical proof of the 
existence of political cycles, thereafter; the second objective concerned with characterising the 
cyclical properties of political cycle is explored. To this end, this Chapter is divided into five 
sections. Asides section one, the estimation results of the Univariate ARIMA model are 
presented in section two. In section three, dynamic factor model findings are presented, while 
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in section four, the cyclical properties of the political cycle detected is shown and finally, in 
section five, summary of findings is given. 
5.2 Presentation of Results 
5.2.1 Univariate ARIMAX model: Existence of Political Cycles 
The Univariate ARIMAX method provides a simple atheoretical framework through which 
political cycles can be detected. The technique is most suited to this study, since it assumes that 
mean shifts or structural changes in macroeconomic time series (RGDP, GE, MS and ED) are 





𝑌  𝜃  ∝ 𝑌 ∑ 𝜏 𝑃    𝛽 𝜀                                                                            (4.1) 






           𝑌 :   lag order of Autoregressive terms  
           𝑃 :      Exogenous Political Variables 
           𝜀 :   lag order of Moving Averages  
           𝜃:        Constant term 
           ∝ :      Parameter of AR (p) process 
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 𝛽  :     Parameter of MA (q) process 
 𝜏:       Parameters showing the effect of a shift in political variables on 𝑌  
Apriori expectation: 𝜏 should be statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
Equation 4.1 can be re-written as: 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝜃  ∝ 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 ∑ 𝜏 𝑃    𝛽 𝜀                                                           (5.1) 
𝐺𝐸  𝜃  ∝ 𝐺𝐸 ∑ 𝜏 𝑃    𝛽 𝜀                                                                     (5.2) 
𝑀𝑆  𝜃  ∝ 𝑀𝑆 ∑ 𝜏 𝑃    𝛽 𝜀                                                                    (5.3) 
𝐸𝐷  𝜃  ∝ 𝐸𝐷 ∑ 𝜏 𝑃    𝛽 𝜀                                                                    (5.4) 
As ARMAX (p,q) models, equations 5.1 -5.4 is solved using the Box-Jenkins Iterative Method. 
Following the Box-Jenkins procedure, we run time plot of each variables for the purpose of 
detecting (non) stationarity and outliers. 
Figure 5.1: Time Series Plot 
RGDP       GE 
 
































However, judging by requirement that time series be weakly stationary so that estimates are 
stable and well-behaved, formal unit roots tests- Augmented Dickey Fuller and the Philip-
Perron are used to test stationarity in our variables. The results confirm the visual inspection 
above. The unit root tests statistics are less than the critical values at 5 per cent. Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root and conclude that the time series 
variables are stationary at levels (i.e: I(0)) 
Table 5.1: Result of Unit root tests   
 Augmented Dickey Fuller Philip-Perron 





















Source: Author’s compilation 
Note: Numbers in bracket () denote critical values at 5%  






























Upon confirming that the variables RGDP, GE, MS and ED are stationary, the next step in 
fitting the ‘best’ ARMAX (p,q) model is using Autocorrelation functions and Partial 
Autocorrelation functions in identifying the order of the model to be used.  
Figure 5.2: Autocorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation Functions of variables used 
RGDP 
 
The autocorrelation function plot of RGDP with a 95 per cent confidence band shows 
significant spikes at lag one and three only. The spikes are decaying in an oscillatory manner, 
suggesting an AR(1) process. On the other hand, the PACF shows significant spikes at lags one 
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The autocorrelation function plot of GE with a 95 per cent confidence band reflects a clear 
wave-like decay among the lags. There are significant spikes at lags one, six, seven and eight. 




The autocorrelation function plot of MS with a 95 per cent confidence band shows only a 
significant spike at lag one and insignificant spikes under subsequent lags. Furthermore, there 
is a swing-like pattern among the spikes. With a positive spike at lag one, an MA (1) process 
is probable. The Partial Autocorrelation function with a 95 per cent confidence band, a positive 
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The autocorrelation function plot of ED with a 95 per cent confidence band shows only a 
significant spike at lag one and insignificant spikes under subsequent lags. Furthermore, there 
seems to be an oscillatory pattern among the spikes. With a positive spike at lag one, an MA(1) 
process may be suggested. Surveying the Partial Autocorrelation function with a 95 per cent 
confidence band, a positive significant spike is also seen in lag one, however, the spike seems 
to be patterned in an irregular pattern; this may suggest an ARMA process. 
However, to know the true ARMAX order, equations (5.1), (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4), were fitted 
using several specifications. Upon identification, the plausible ARMAX (p,q) orders for each 
of the relevant time series were: 
Macro variables                          ARMA orders 
RGDP 104 201 205 303 305 
GE 102 400 500 502 600 
MS 201 202 102 301 302 
ED 100 101 107 204 304 
Source: Author’s compilation 
The respective orders were selected using statistical significance of political variables in the 
model; the Akaike Information Criterion and Bayesian Information Criterion; and white noise 
specification in the residuals of the ARMAX models. 
Finally, the orders ARMAX (104, 502, 202 and 101) were selected as best fit for RGDP, GE, 
MS and ED respectively. 
5.2.1.1 RGDP: The existence of political cycles in aggregate economic activity 
Our ‘best’ ARMAX (1, 0, 4) model was fitted to RGDP data for Nigeria over the time period 
1960-2010. Therefore equation (5.1) is explicitly re-written as:  
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𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃  ∝  ∝  𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃  𝛽  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖 𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑟  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝛾 𝜀 +𝜀  
(5.5) 
Where: 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 : Real Gross Domestic Product 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 : Real Gross Domestic Product at first lag 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝 : Political regime dummy defining period in which a head of government was in office 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑒 : Political regime dummy defining the ethnic origin of head of government 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑟 : Political regime defining dummy if government was military or civilian 
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖 : Political regime dummy defining economic policy thrust of government 
𝛾 𝜀 : MA (q) where q=1,...,4 
𝜀 : Stochastic error term, where 𝜀 ≅ 𝑁 0, 𝜎   
Equation (5.5) was estimated using Stata Version 11. Stata Version 11 estimates ARMAX (p,q) 
models by an iterative Maximum Likelihood approach using the Kalman Filter Procedure. 
Further, Robust Standard errors were reported. These variant of error prove to be robust to 
misspecification issues and other violations of conventional OLS regressions such as 
heteroskedasticity. In line with the objective of this study, the primary concern with the 
ARMAX estimation is with the value of coefficients and statistical significance of the political 
dummies used. The results show: 
Table 5.2: ML estimation of Political Cycle in RGDP 



















                Source: Author’s compilation      
  Note: co-efficient interpreted using 100*(exp (co-efficient)-1) 
*statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
** Statistically different from zero at 10 per cent 
Since RGDP is in logarithm, the actual impact of estimated co-efficient of political dummies 
on RGDP is derived by the formula:  
                            100 𝑒  1   
Using this formula, it follows that a unit increase in political dummies, DUMP, DUME, 
DUMR and DUMI led to a 10.96 per cent increase, 15.46 per cent decrease, 19.48 per cent 
increase and 1 per cent increase in the fluctuations in RGDP.  
Furthermore, the P-value shows that all political dummies except DUMI are statistically 
significant at 5 per cent and at 10 per cent (in the case of DUMP). Consequently, based on the 
statistical significance of the co-efficient of these political dummies, one can then reject the 
null hypothesis of the thesis and conclude there is evidence of political cycle in Nigeria.  
Albeit, these political cycles are driven by: (a) Changes in political regimes as power fluctuate 
from one head of government to the other ( b) Changes in the ethnic background of successive 
governments and   (c) Changes in the regime type of successive governments. On the other 
hand, the changes in the economic policy thrust of government did not induce economic 
fluctuation over the period 1960-2010. 
The statistical implication of the results is that: 
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a. As power changed overtime, from a head of government to another, a 10.96 per cent 
increase in aggregate economic fluctuations is recorded. 
b. As political power switched from a southern head of government to a Northern one, 
this reduced economic fluctuations by 15.46 per cent 
c. As political power changed from military to civilian government, this exacerbated 
economic fluctuations by the highest magnitude of 19.48 per cent.  
5.2.1.2 GE: The existence of political cycles in fiscal variable  
An ARMAX (5, 0, 2) model was found to be most suited to Government expenditure (GE) data 
for Nigeria over the time period 1960-2010. Therefore, equation (5.2) is explicitly re-written 
as:  
𝐺𝐸  ∝  ∝  𝐺𝐸  𝛽  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖 𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑟  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝛾 𝜀 +𝜀   (5.6) 
Parameters remain as defined beforehand. Except that p= 1,...,5 and j= 1, 2. The result of the 
Maximum Likelihood estimation of equation (5.6) is shown below. 
 
Table 5.3: ML estimation of Political Cycle in Government Expenditure 

















         Source: Author’s compilation 
Note: co-efficient interpreted using 100*(exp (co-efficient)-1) 
*statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
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Results from the table above indicates that a unit change in DUMP, DUME, DUMR and DUMI  
led to a 6.39 per cent, 9.86 per cent, 4.08 per cent and 24.86 per cent increase in fluctuations in 
central government’s total spending.  
Specifically, only government’s economic policy thrust (DUMI) is seen to induce fluctuations 
in government expenditure. The implication is that as government’s economic policy switched 
from contractionary to expansionary; on average 24.86 per cent swings in fiscal policy are 
induced.  
5.2.1.3. MS: The existence of political cycles in monetary variable  
To capture political cycle fluctuations in monetary policy in Nigeria, an ARMAX (2,0,2) model 
is fitted such that: 
𝑀𝑆  ∝  ∝  𝑀𝑆  𝛽  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖 𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑟  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝛾 𝜀 +𝜀   (5.7) 
Parameters remain as defined beforehand. Except that p= 1, 2 and j= 1, 2. The result of the 
Maximum Likelihood estimation of equation (5.7) is shown below. 
 
Table 5.4: ML estimation of Political Cycle in Money Supply 



















Source: Author’s compilation 
 
Note: co-efficient interpreted using 100*(exp (co-efficient)-1) 
*statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
** Statistically different from zero at 10 per cent 
 
The estimation reveals that a change in DUMP, DUME, DUMR, DUMI led to a 1.21 per cent 
reduction; 12.75 per cent reduction, 12.08 per cent increase and 1.51 per cent increase in 
money supply fluctuations, over the sample period 1960-2010. 
 Specifically, as a result of the statistical significance of DUME, one can imply that as regimes 
switched from a south-led government to a north-led one, this reduced Money supply 
fluctuations. 
5.2.1.4. ED: The existence of political cycles in external debt policy variable  
We fit ARMAX (1, 0, 7) to time series data on external debt, so as to account for proof of 
political cycle fluctuations in external debt policy in Nigeria. The equation below is estimated.  
𝐸𝐷  ∝  ∝ 𝐸𝐷  𝛽  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑝  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑖 𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑟  𝛽 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝛾 𝜀 +𝜀  --(5.8) 
Parameters remain as defined beforehand. Except j= 1,...,7 The result of the Maximum 
Likelihood estimation of equation (5.8) is shown below. 
 
Table 5.5: ML estimation of Political Cycle in External debt 



















       Source: Author’s compilation 
Note: co-efficient interpreted using 100*(exp (co-efficient)-1) 
*statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
** Statistically different from zero at 10 per cent 
The results above shows that a unit change to in DUMP, DUME, DUMR and DUMI leads to 
a 17.7 per cent, 23.37 per cent, 7.47 per cent and 5.23 per cent increase in external debt policy.  
Specifically, only political regimes as defined by change in head of government (DUMP) 
accounts for significant fluctuations in external debt policy. More succinctly, as the heads of 








5.2.2 Diagnostic Check on Residuals of ARMAX Models 
Table 5.6: Residual testing of ARMAX model 



































































Source: Author’s compilation 
Note: AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; BIC: Bayesian Information Criterion; Q-test: Portmanteau Q-test  
Judging from the autocorrelation function plot of residuals and the associated Portmanteau Q-
statistics, each ARMAX models fit the data well. The various spikes at different lags under the 
ACF residual plot are seen to fall within the shaded region. This implies that all the lags are 
not statistically significant. Furthermore, the Q-statistics show insignificant values. An 
indication of the insignificance of both tests is that the residuals of the various ARMAX models 
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Bartlett's formula for MA(q) 95% confidence bands
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5.3 Dynamic Factor Models  
In this section, a dynamic factor model is estimated to test the second objective of this work: 
characterising the business cycle properties of the political cycles detected in the preceding 
section.  
In the context of this work, the dynamic factor system models several endogenous variables 
(RGDP, GE, MS and ED) as linear functions of an unobserved factor (political dummy). The 
dynamic factor model used in this study, answers the question: 
‘Can an unobserved factor (in this case political dummy) 
explain the co-movement or fluctuations in the relevant 
macroeconomic series data used for Nigeria over the period 
1960-2010?’ 
In the context of this work, we estimate a dynamic factor model where: 
𝑌    𝛼 𝐿 𝑓   𝑒                                                                                                                 (4.2) 
𝑓  𝛽 𝐿 𝑓  𝑣                                                                                                             (4.3) 
Where: 
𝑌    …   𝑒   
𝑖 1, … , 4  and  𝑡 1, … , 𝑛  
𝑌  : 4 by 1 vector of observable time series, comprising RGDP, GE, MS and ED  
𝑓  : Unobserved dynamic factor, AVDUM 
𝑒  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣 : Stochastic error term 
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) are assumed to be stationary processes and (𝑒  and 𝑣 are assumed to 
be Gaussian). 
Equation 4.2 and 4.3 are estimated using the Stata Version 11. Stata Version 11 estimates 
dynamic factors model by a Maximum Likelihhod procedure using the Kalman Filter. 
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According to Stata User Guide Manual 12, the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimator is 
implemented by writing the equation in state-space form and then the Kalman Filter is used 
to derive and implement the log likelihood. However, a limitation of the use of the Kalman 
Filter is that of dimensionality of the observable variables and the unobserved factors. In this 
light, limited number of parameters was only allowed to be estimated in such a way that only 
observable time series variables strictly greater than unobserved factor: 𝑋  𝑓  was allowed. 
This constrained the author to finding the average of the four political dummies used earlier. 
The averaged political dummy is called AVDUM 
Upon estimation of our dynamic factor model, the result shows that the unobserved factor 
AVDUM is a significant predictor of the co-movements or fluctuations in MS, ED and GE, 
but not in RGDP.  
Table 5.7: ML Estimation of Dynamic Factor Model 
Unobserved Factor: AVDUM, Wald test=88.20 (P-Value=0.0000) 













 Source: Author’s compilation 
Note:    co-efficient interpreted using 100*(exp (co-efficient)-1) since dummies are used. 
 *statistically different from zero at 5 per cent 
** Statistically different from zero at 10 per cent 
Upon estimation of equations (4.2) and (4.3), we derive a one-step-ahead forecast of 𝑓 . This 




Figure 5.3 : Political Shock Component 
 
Source: Author’s compilation 
5.3.1 Diagnostic Checking 
The Portmanteau Q-test on residuals is used to diagnose the fitness of the estimated model. 
At 1 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, the estimated model can be said to have white noise 
residuals, since the P-value of the Q-statistic is 0.063.  
5.4 The Cyclical Properties of the Political Cycle 
In this section, the cyclical characteristics of the estimated political shock is explained.to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this becomes one of the first attempt to characterise political 
cycle properties. Among the benefits of characterising the political cycles include: analysing 
political dynamics to measure its impact and magnitude on aggregate economic fluctuation in 
Nigeria; then, understanding the volatility, persistence and co-movement of political 






















characterising the cyclical properties of politically-induced fluctuation is essential to generate 
some stylized facts about the political economy of Nigeria. 
One finds that the sources and nature of economic fluctuations or shocks are a central concern 
in business cycle analysis. However, a challenge in political cycles studies is attempting to 
quantify ‘political shocks’, so as to gauge its underlying properties and its magnitude. To 
address this challenge, the dynamic factor model is used to extract this ‘political shock’ 
component.  
Upon extracting the political shocks, the political cycles detected in the previous section is 
characterised. In explaining the cyclical properties of the political fluctuations, we focus on the 
following business cycle statistical moments. 
Table 5.8: Business Cycle Moments of Political shocks 






Volatility and magnitude of cycle 
Persistence 
Co-movement (Procyclicity or not) 
The business cycle characterization procedure to be used stems from Alege (2008) who 
characterised business cycle fluctuations in Nigeria. In examining the statistical feature of any 
cyclical component, it is necessary to establish the stationarity of the component. To this, the 
Dickey Fuller and Philip Perron Test are used. The extracted political cycle component is called 
FACT 
Table 5.9: Unit root test on Political Shock ‘FACT’ 
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Augmented Dickey Fuller       Philip Perron 
 Intercept only Intercept+ Trend Intercept only Intercept+ Trend
FACT -3.237 (-2.936) -3.210 (-3.185) -3.192 (-2.930) -3.161 (-3.500) 
  
The unit root test rejected the null hypothesis at intercept only but failed to reject at intercept 
and trend. So as to address this contrast, the Dickey Fuller GLS was used which confirmed 
FACT to be I(1). Therefore FACT was differenced by order 1. 
Once differenced, the following business cycle properties were found: 
a. Volatility: 
From Alege (2004), volatility is a measure of the amplitude of fluctuations. In this study, 
volatility is measured by percent standard deviation.  
From above, volatility of the political dynamics is 8.7 %. Unfortunately, it may be difficult to 
ascertain the truth weight of this figure. However, one can rely on the value of the mean. The 
mean with a value of 0.2 per cent shows that the political shocks in Nigeria are not volatile. 
This is because Alege (2008) opines that the mean value of a variable expressed in percentage 
can also be used as a measure of fluctuations. If not greater than 1, it implies the variable is not 
subject to very high fluctuations. Furthermore, this study interprets that the value of mean has 
implication for the magnitude or contribution of political shocks to aggregate economic 
fluctuations. On average, political shocks is seen to statistically contribute only 0.2 per cent to 
aggregate economic fluctuations in Nigeria. 
                                                              
       factd     .0023248   .0872122     -.1729346    .1775842
                                                              
                     Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                              




This is measured by the autocorrelation of an economic time series. It is expected the first 
four autocorrelations be strongly positive. Upon examining the autocorrelation of political 
shock ‘FACT’ one finds that the first four lags are negative and insignificant. Using Agenor 
et al (1999), it is concluded that political shocks cannot be characterised as business cycles. 
c. Co-movement:  
The co-movement or correlation of political shocks with the variables used in this study-
RGDP, GE, MS and ED are measured by the correlation co-efficient 𝛾 such that if 𝛾 > 0, a 
variable is procyclical with political shock, if  𝛾  < 0, a variable is countercyclical with 
political shock and if 𝛾 = 0, a variable is acyclical with political shock. The result shown 
below  












    Source: Author’s compilation 
From the results above, political shocks produces countercyclical movements in RGDP and 
GE but produces procyclical movement in MS and ED. 
 
5.5 Summary of findings:  
1. The existence of Political Cycles 
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Table 5.11: Univariate ARIMAX Models 














In the Univariate Context, there is evidence of political cycle fluctuations in both aggregate 
macroeconomic outcome, as proxied by Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) and policy 
variables as reflected in Government expenditure, Money Supply ratio and External debt.  
Therefore testing the null hypothesis that political regimes have not induced economic 
fluctuations in Nigeria, over the period 1960-2010, the univariate analysis rejects this null 
hypothesis for both macroeconomic outcomes and policy variables.  
As to the evidence of the existence of political cycles, the sources of these shocks vary and 
include: 
a. RGDP: In the aggregate economy, over the sample period 1960-2010, political cycles 
were induced by: 
1. Change in head of government from one political regime to another, 
exacerbated aggregate economic fluctuations. This is not surprising in a weak 
political system with poor checks and balances as illustrated by the World 
Governance Indicator (2012) -refer to stylized facts. 
2. Change in head of government from a south leader to a north leader stabilized 
aggregate economic fluctuation. This confirms the speculation that political 
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ideology as shaped by a government ethnic origin can induce or stabilize 
fluctuations.  
3. Alternation of political regimes from military to civilian government 
exacerbated economic fluctuations in Nigeria. thus, political ideology as shaped 
by the regime type of government are relevant for determining politically-
induced fluctuations 
 
b. Government Expenditure: In fiscal policy, over the sample period 1960-2010, political 
cycle was induced by the type of economic policy leaning- contraction or expansionary 
taken by government. However, governments that were inclined to austere policies 
exacerbated fluctuations in this policy variable, than the expansionary-inclined ones. 
c. Money Supply: In monetary policy, a change in government from South to North 
stabilized fluctuations. The existence of political cycle in this variable, indicates the 
non-independence of the central bank of Nigeria from political motives 
d. External debt: In Nigeria’s external debt position, change in government from one 





2. Business cycle properties of political shocks 
Table 5.12: Dynamic Factor Model 
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First 4 lags are negative and 
insignificant 
RGDP: -0.0124 
GE:      -0.2365 
MS:       0.3641 
ED:       0.1225 
 
From the table, we find that political cycles are not volatile, such as they are not subject to high 
fluctuations. We also find that the weak persistence of the cycle makes it difficult to be 
characterized as a business cycle. Furthermore, it is surprising to find a negligible magnitude 
of political shocks. It implies that other sources of shocks are likely to induce economic 
fluctuations in the aggregate economy than pure government effect. This finding indirectly 
conforms to Alege (2004) who considers productivity, exports and money shocks as sources 










Following the fact that economic fluctuations are more pronounced in developing countries 
(such as Nigeria), than developed countries and that, this has led policymakers/politicians to 
propose mitigating measures. Furthermore, due to the speculation that by outright policy 
mistakes and/or vested self-interest, policymakers/politicians can be a source of economic 
fluctuations in Nigeria, coupled with low constraints on the decision making power of 
politicians in government; this study argued that politically-induced fluctuations were highly 
probable in Nigeria. 
Following this background, the study sought to examine the relationship between political 
regimes and economic fluctuations in Nigeria. Its specific objectives were to test for the 
existence of political cycles and to characterize the nature of the political cycles detected in the 
case of Nigeria. To this end, the study tested the null hypothesis that politically-induced 
fluctuations did not exist over the study period 1960 to 2010, in Nigeria. 
The study stood on existing political business cycle theories, particularly the Hibbs (1977)’s 
Partisan variant. However, in adapting the theory to Nigeria, some of its assumptions were 
relaxed. Major changes was to assume that rather than the conventional left-right wing, the 
ideological divide stems from ethnic background, political regime type and economic policy 
thrust. Furthermore, the assumption that Nigeria had a stylized, well-developed democratic 
institution was relaxed for the fact that Nigeria had a mix of both authoritarian and democratic 
rules. 
To achieve the two specific objectives of the study, two atheoretical estimation techniques were 
used: The Univariate ARIMA, Box-Jenkin Method and the Dynamic Factor model method. 
These two methods were used to test annual empirical data on Nigeria from 1960-2010, using 
macroeconomic policy variables such as Government Expenditure (GE); Money Supply (MS) 
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and External Debt (ED) that capture fiscal, monetary and external debt policy, respectively. 
Also, Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP) was used as proxy for the aggregate economy. 
The Univariate ARIMA model was used to examine the existence of the political cycles. It 
modelled each macroeconomic variable-RGDP, GE, MS and ED- as a linear function of an 
ARMA process and four exogenous intervention variables. The exogenous intervention 
variables used were political dummies: DUMP, DUME, DUMR and DUMI. Once the political 
dummies were statistically significant, the null hypothesis was rejected and the existence of 
political cycles was confirmed. 
On the other hand, the Multivariate Dynamic Factor Model was used to address the second 
objective of this thesis. From the technique, an unobserved factor was estimated and its one-
step ahead forecast obtained, this captured the political shock component. Unlike the ARIMA 
model, it had a more realistic assumption of feedback among macro variables in an economic 
system. However, this technique was ridden with dimensionality issue, which was bypassed by 
using a composite Political dummy AVDUM. 
Using both the ARIMA and Dynamic Factor techniques, the estimation strategy of the study 
proceeded from extracting cyclical component of the economic variables-RGDP, GE, MS and 
ED- using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. Thereafter, stationarity tests using Augmented Dickey 
Fuller and Philip Perron method was carried out on the cyclical component of the variables. 
Then the variables were estimated, hypothesis tested and diagnostic test carried out. It is worthy 
of note that in using the dynamic factor model, after the aforementioned procedures, a ‘political 
cycle’ data was extracted, and its business cycle properties tested. 
Answers found using the estimation techniques and strategies above established the 
significance of the study. Therefore, the study had implication for validating the existence or 
not of political cycles. Secondly, it was useful for assessing the magnitude of political shocks 
119 
 
and thereby, its relevance among other sources of shocks. Thereafter, it helped to evaluate the 
policymaking environment in Nigeria and finally, some political economy stylized facts for 
Nigeria were derived. 
Consequently, this study was novel in testing the existence of political business cycle outside 
a democratic or electoral framework. This is unlike existing studies that confine themselves to 
studying political cycles within an electoral system. Secondly, the study was novel in using for 
the first time, a dynamic factor model in estimating and extracting political shocks. On a third 
note, this study was also novel in characterising the business cycle properties of political shocks 
and then quantifying its magnitude among other sources of potential shocks to the Nigerian 
economy. 
6.2 Major Findings  
Chapters 3 and 4 are the primary source of findings in this study. The stylized facts taking on 
the requisite descriptive analysis, established among other facts, that politics indeed was a 
determinant of economic outcome. 
On the other hand, the study present two sets of estimation results for the Univariate ARIMA 
and Multivariate Dynamic Factor Models, respectively. In answering the first research question 
‘Do political cycles exist in the Nigerian economy? The ARIMA model was used to test for 
this phenomenon in four separate macroeconomic variables- RGDP, GE, MS and ED. An 
implication of using these four variables, is that political cycles were tested in, policy variable-
GE, MS and ED; and aggregate economic performance- RGDP. Estimated results revealed tha 
political cycles existed in all the variables. This finding conformed with Tarawalie et al 
(undated), who used Univariate ARIMA model to test for conventional political cycles on 
democratic Nigeria (1999-2007). 
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In another manner, the Multivariate dynamic factor technique was used to answer the second 
question posed by this thesis: ‘What are the business cycle statistical properties of the political 
cycles?’ business cycle moments such as mean, standard deviation (measure of volatility), 
autocorrelation (measure of persistence) and correlation (measure of co-movements) were 
examined using the political shocks extracted from the dynamic factor model. The results 
showed that political shock was not subject to high fluctuation; by measure of persistence, they 
were not strong enough to qualify as cycles. By means of co-movement, it was seen that 
political shocks produced a countercyclical movement in RGDP and GE; and a procyclical 
impact on MS and ED. The mean value further established the non-volatility of the political 
shocks but gave a bewildering statistical fact that political shocks only contributed 0.2 per cent 
to economic fluctuations in Nigeria. 
The implication of this finding is that although political cycle exists, they are not a major source 
of shocks to Nigeria’s economy. This means that sources of shocks different from political 





6.3 Political Economy Implication of Findings and Recommendation 
To re-iterate the main findings: Political cycle exists in both policy variables and the aggregate 
macro economy. Also, political shocks have contributed a statistical 0.2 per cent on average 
over the period 1960-2010 to aggregate economic fluctuations. 
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First, a political economic implication of the study of political shocks is considering if changes 
in successive government or political regimes impact on the economy in the short run. Our 
results show that indeed changes in successive governments in Nigeria since 1960-2010 has 
impacted on both macroeconomic policy variables and aggregate economy in the short run. 
This is not surprising as these policy variables GE, MS and ED are policy instruments under 
the direct influence of government  
A related implication of evidence of political cycles in Nigeria, to the above, is confirming the 
existence of a weak political structure in Nigeria, with poor checks and balances that make 
governments with varying personally-defined ideologies (that are shaped by regime type, 
ethnic origin and current economic situations) prone to self-seeking activities. 
Also, in line with Faal (2007), A broader implication of our findings points to the potential 
incompatibility between the pressures motivating political business cycles and ongoing efforts 
on economic and political reform, including long term economic targets. 
 
Furthermore, the small magnitude of political shocks deduced from the business cycle 
properties of the political cycle, implies that other source of shocks other than political shocks 
are relevant in explaining short run outcomes (fluctuations) in Nigeria. 
In another dimension, the insignificance of political shocks means that the aggregate economic 
performance of Nigeria over the study period was largely unaffected by changes in government 
activities in the short run, such that political instability and policy reversals has had no impact 
on the economy. However, this study argues that, it is more likely that an insignificant political 
shock is a pointer to the ineffectiveness of past government economic policies and plans. 
 
Since the 1960s, successive governments in Nigeria embarked on specific policies ranging 
from the Import Substitution Strategy, the Indigenization Decree, Economic Stabilization Act 
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and the Structural Adjustment Programs, among others. The small magnitude of political 
shocks depicts that these policies have had only minimal real effects on the economy.  
 
Based on the implications of the major findings of this study, it is necessary that political 
economic scholars and the government consider the following: 
a. There is need for a critical, empirically-based review of the effect of past government 
specific-measures on the economy 
b. The strength of the discretionary policy environment in which past policies were 
implemented, must be assessed and possible options of putting in place policy rules that 
guide implementation and assessment of policies be considered. this is for the purpose 
of strengthening the current policy making and implementation structures in Nigeria 
c. Since politics are deduced to be negligible sources of shocks in this study, there is need 
to determine the major sources of shocks to the Nigerian economy, and thereby propose 
measure to mitigate short run fluctuations in Nigeria, for the purpose of enhancing 
macroeconomic stability. 
6.4   Contribution to Knowledge 
First of all, it is worthy of note that this study contributed to knowledge, by filling the following 
research gaps: First the study tested the existence of political business cycle outside a 
democratic or electoral framework. This is unlike existing studies that confine themselves to 
studying political cycles with an electoral system. Secondly, the study used for the first time a 
dynamic factor model in estimating and extracting political shocks. On a third note, this study 
was genuine in being the first to best of author’s knowledge in characterising the business cycle 
properties of political shocks and then quantifying its magnitude among other sources of 
potential shocks to the Nigerian economy. 
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In another dimension, the study contributed to knowledge by adding to the sparse literature on 
political business cycle in Sub Saharan Africa and particularly, in Nigeria. Furthermore, some 
stylized facts on political economy in Nigeria were established. 
6.5 Conclusion and Future Line of Research 
In a political environment typified by weak political institutions; discretionary policymaking 
with no constraints on politicians; poor accountability, transparency and corruption; policy 
reversal, mistakes and abandonment, political cycles are expected to exist and its magnitude 
great. Therefore, this thesis finds that politically-induced fluctuation exist in both policy 
variables and the aggregate economy. Surprisingly, the study finds that politically induced 
cycles are only a small proportion of aggregate economic fluctuations in Nigeria. Then, it 
becomes interesting to investigate the magnitude of other potential source of shocks vis-a-vis 
political fluctuations. 
From another angle, since the results in this study are statistically derived, as they are based on 
atheoretical estimation, it will be interesting to build theoretical models such as Dynamic 
Stochastic General equilibrium models where politics can be factored, in examining the 
existence of political cycles in Nigeria. 
Furthermore, high frequency data prove to be more revealing in business cycle analysis than 
low frequency data, this study proposes that future research undertake the study of political 
cycles using high frequency data such as quarterly series. 
In another light, it proves informative to ascertain the real weight of the political shock obtained 
from the dynamic factor model, by conducting comparative country-specific studies to 
















Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. And Y. Thiaicharoen (2002) “Institutional Causes,  
           Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth”, Working Paper, 
           NBER  9124 
Adedipe, B. (2004) “The impact of oil on Nigeria’s Economic policy formulation”, being the Text   
           of a paper presented at the conference on Nigeria: Maximizing Pro-poor Growth:  
           Regenerating the Socio-economic Database, organized by Overseas Development  
           Institute in collaboration with the Nigerian Economic Summit Group, 16th / 17th June   
           2004 
Agenor, P.R., McDermott, C.J. and E.S Prasad (1999) “Macroeconomic Fluctuations in 
125 
 
           Developing Countries: Some Stylized Facts”, Working Paper, International   
           Monetary Fund  
Alege, P.O (2008) “Macroeconomic Policies and Business Cycles in Nigeria” An unpublished   
           Ph.d Dissertation, Department of Economics, Covenant University, Ota 
Alesina, A. and N. Roubini (1990) “Political Cycles in OECD Economies” Review of Economic 
            Studies 59(4): 663-688, available online 
           @ http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553025, accessed April 26,                           
           2013 
Alesina, A. and J. Sachs (1986) “Political Parties and the Business cycles in the United States” ,  
          NBER Working Paper No.1940 
Akhmedov, A. and E. Zhuravskaya (2003) “Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young  
          Democracy Setting”, Working Paper w0024, Center for Economic and Financial Research 
Allen, S.D., Sulock, J.M. and W.A. Sabo (1986) “The Political Business Cycle: How Significant?” 
         ,Public Finance Quarterly, 14(1): 107-112  
 
Andrikopoulos, A., Loizides, I. and K. Prodromidis (2004) “Fiscal Policy and Political Business  
           Cycles in the EU” , European Journal of Political Economy, Elseiver, Vol. 20(1): 125-152    
Barberia, L.G. and Avelino, G. (2011) “Do Political Budget Cycles Differ from Latin American 
           Democracies?” Economia, Vol. 11 (2):101-134, Brookings Institution Press 
Batool, I. and G. Sieg (2009) “Pakistan, Politics and Political Business cycles”, Economics  
           Department Working Paper Series No.07, Technische Universitat, available  
           online @ http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51317/1/623661950.pdf 
Berger, H. and U. Woitek (1997) “Searching for Political Business Cycles in Germany”, Public  
           Choice, 91 (2): 179-197 
Berlemann, M. and G. Markwardt (2003) “Partisan cycles and electoral uncertainty” Dresden  
126 
 
           discussion paper in economics, No. 01/03, available online @                                       
           http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48139 
Block, S.A (1999) “Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic Reform: The Case  
           of Africa” , available online @ http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304‐3878(01)00184‐5 
Block, S.A., Singh, S. and K.E. Feree (2003) “Multiparty Competition, Founding Elections and   
           Political Business Cycles”, Journal of African Economies, CSAE, Vol.12(3):444-468 
Bloomberg, S.B. and G.D. Hess (2000) “Is the Political Business Cycle for Real?” Working Paper  
           0016, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, available @   
           http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/workpaper/2000/Wp0016.pdf 
Central Bank of Nigeria (2011) Statistical Bulletin, available @              
           http://www.cenbank.org/documents/Statbulletin.asp 
Chauvet, S. and P. Collier (2008) “Elections and Economic Policy in Developing Countries”,            
          Developpment Institutions and Analyses de Long terme , DT/2008-11 
 
 
Cusacks, T.R. and S. Fuchs (2002) “Ideology, Institutions and Public Spending” Discussion  
          Paper,   Working Group on Institutions, States, and Markets, Wissenschaftszentrum    
          Berlin für Sozialforschung      
Drazen, A. (2001) “How Does Politics Affect Economic Outcomes? Insights from “New”    
          Political Economy” available @ www.apsanet.org/~polecon/Drazen.pdf 
Drazen, A. and A. Brender (2004) “Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established  
          Democracies, available online @ www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/macro/mac04/drazen2‐  
041019.pdf 
Drazen, A. (2008)  “Political Business Cycles” Article written for  The New Palgrave Dictionary   
          Of Economics   
127 
 
Drazen, A. (2006) “Is there a different Political Economy for Developing Countries? Issues,  
          Perspectives and Methodology, Africa Economic Research Consortium, available online @   
          http://econweb.umd.edu/~drazen/Working_Papers/PE_of_Development_final.pdf 
Drazen, A. (2001) “The Political Business Cycle after 25 years”, NBER Macroeconomic Annual  
          15: 75-138, available online @ http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11055 
Enders, W.  (2010) “Applied Econometrics Time Series” 3ed, United States: John Wiley and Sons 
Erlandsson, M. (2001) “Partisan differences in Swedish Macroeconomic Policy”, available online 
          @ http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2843 
Faal, E. (2007) “Political Budget Cycles in Papua New Guinea” , IMF Working Paper WP/07/219 
Faust, J. and J. Irons (1996) “Money, Politics and the Post-War business cycle”, International 
          Finance Discussion Papers No. 572, Board of Governors of the Federal                                   




Franzese, R.J. (1999) “Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini with Gerald D. Cohen, Political    
           Cycles and the Macroeconomy, The MIT Press, 1997”, A review, available   
           online @ http://www- 
personal.umich.edu/~franzese/ARwC.PoliticalCyclesAndTheMacroeconomy.BookReview.pdf 
Freedom House (2013) available online @ www.freedomhouse.org                                
French, W.M. (2001) “Estimating Changes in trend growth of Total Factor Productivity: Kalman      
           and H-P Filters versus a Markov-switching framework”, Board of Governors   
           of the Federal Reserve System        
Grier, K. (1987) “Presidential Elections and Federal Reserve Policy: An empirical Test” , Southern
           Economic Journal, Vol.54 (2): 475-486, available online  
128 
 
           @ http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0038- 
           4038%28198710%2954%3A2%3C475%3APEAFRP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A 
Grier, K. (2007)”Presidential Elections and Real GDP growth in the USA, 1961-2004”, available  
           online @ faculty‐staff.ou.edu/G/Kevin.B.Grier‐1/pc2007.pdf 
Gujarati, D.N and D.C. Porter (2009) “Basic Econometrics” 5 ed, International Edition,  
           New York: McGraw- Hill 
Heckelman, J.C (2002) “Variable Rational Partisan Models: Theory and some evidence” ,  
           Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 35(3): 568-585 
Heckelman, J.C and J.H. Wood (2005) “Political Monetary Cycles under Alternative Institutions:  
           The Independent Treasury and The Federal Reserve, Economics & Politics, 
           Vol. 17(3): 331-350: Blackwell Publishing Limited 
Hibbs, D.A. (1992) “Partisan Theory after fifteen years”, European Journal of Political   
           Economy,8: 361-373           
 
 
Hibbs, D.A (1977) “Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy” , The American Political Science 
            Review, Vol 71 (4):1467-1487, available online @   
            http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-   
           0554%28197712%2971%3A4%3C1467%3APPAMP%3E2.0.0.CO%3B2-8 
Higashijima, M. (2011) “Economic Manipulations in Kyrgyz Elections, 1995-2011: A Tentative  
           Analysis”, SRC Research Fellows Working Papers 
Index on Economic Freedom (2013), available from  www.heritage.org 
International Monetary Fund (2012) World Economic Outlook, available @  
           www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/weodata/index.aspx 
Ito, T. (1989)  “Endogenous Election Timings and Political Business Cycles in Japan”, NBER  
129 
 
            Working Paper Series No. 3128 
Jula, D. (2001) “Economic Impact of Political Cycles-The Relevance of European experiences for  
           Romania” , Research Centre on Transition Economies, available online                           
           @ www.ipe.ro/RePEc/WorkingPapers/wpiecf081101.pdf 
Kalecki (1943) “Political Aspects of Full employment” Political Quarterly, 14 (4):322-331, 
Khemani, S. (2000) “Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: Effects of Elections in the Indian  
           States, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.2454 
Krause, S. and F. Mendez (2004) “Policy Makers’ Preferences, Party Ideology and the Political  
           Business Cycle” available online @    
           http://economics.emory.edu/home/assets/documents/krause_03_19_paper.pdf 
Li, Y. (2011) “China’s Political Business Cycle” available online @                                              
           http://igov.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/34.Li_Yinan.pdf 
Little, I.M.D., Cooper, R.N., Corden, W.M. and S. Rajapatirana (1993) “Boom, Crisis and  
           Adjustment: The Macroeconomic Experience of Developing Countries”,  
           Washington, D.C: Oxford University Press 
Maloney, J., Pickering, A. and K. Hadri (2002) “Which type of Central Bank smooths the Political 
           Business cycles”, Royal Economic Society Conference 2002. 
Metz, H.C  (1991) “Nigeria: A country Study”, Library of Congress, Washington 
Milani, F. (2007)  “Political Business Cycles in the New Keynesian Models”, available online @ 
http://www.economics.uci.edu/files/economics/docs/workingpapers/2007-08/Milani-05.pdf 
Natufe, O.I. (2006) “Governance and Politics in Nigeria”, A lecture delivered at Staff and   
           Graduate  Seminar, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of  
           Benin     
Nordhaus, W. (1989) “Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle”, Cowles    
            Foundation Paper No.748, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics 
130 
 
Pepinsky, T. (2007) “Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malysia, St comp  
            Int. dev, 42:136-163, Springer Science 
Ploberger,C. (2012) “Analysing Complex Political Change by Applying the Concept of Regime    
           Change: Identifying the Transformations within the Japanese Political-  
           bureaucratic-business Regime” , Canadian Center of Science and Education, Vol. 8  
           (15), available online @  http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v8n15p12 
Polity IV (2010) “Country Report 2010: Nigeria” 
Potrafke, N. (2006) “Parties matter in allocating Expenditures: Evidence from Germany” DIW- 
           Diskussionspapiere, No. 652, available online @ http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18545 
Potrafke, N. (2010) “Political Cycles and Economic Performance in OECD countries: empirical  
           evidence from 1951-2006” , available online @ http://mpra.ub.uni-                                           
muenchen.de/23834/ 
Rogoff, K. and A. Sibert (1986) “Elections and Macroeconomic Policy cycles” , NBER Working  
            paper No.1838 
 
Sanusi, S.L. (2012) “Nigeria’s Economic Development Aspirations and the Leadership Question: 
            Is there a Nexus?”, Central Bank of Nigeria, A lecture delivered at the 2nd General Dr.   
            Yakubu Gowon Distinguished Annual Lecture, October 19, 2012 available online @ 
http://www.cenbank.org/out/2012/ccd/Nigeria%27s%20Economic%20Development%20Aspiratio
ns%20and%20the%20Leadership%20Question%20-%20Is%20there%20a%20Nexus.pdf                  
Shi, M. And J. Svensson (2006) “Political Budget Cycles: Do they differ across countries and  
            why?” , Journal of Public Economics (90):1367-1389, Elseiver   
Sieg, B. (2006) “A Model of an Opportunistic-Partisan Political Business Cycles”, Scottish  
             Journal of Political Economy, vol. 53(2): 242-252 
Spanakos, T. (undated) “Political Business Cycles in Emerging Markets: Brazil (and Venezuela  
131 
 
             and Argentina)”, available online @ 
Stock, J.H. and M.W. Watson (2007) “Forecasting in Dynamic Factor models subject to structural  
             instability” Conference in honour of David Hendry  
Tarawalie, A.B., Ahortor, C.R.K., Adenekan, A. and M. Conte (undated) “Political Business Cycle 
             and Macroeconomic Convergence: The Case of Ghana and Nigeria, Journal of Monetary 
             and Economic Integration, Vol 11 (1): 58-94 
Tiganas, C.T and C. Peptine (undated) “Political Business cycle and Economic Instability:   
             Literature Review, CES Working paper: 853-865,  
Utomi, P., Duncan, A.  and G. Williams (2007) “Nigeria: The Political Economy of Reform, 
             Strengthening the incentives for economic growth”, The Policy Practice 
Verspagen, B.(2012) “Stylized facts of governance, institutions and economic       
             development: Exploring the institutional profiles database”, UNU-MERIT          
              working Paper Series #2012-036 
William, N.D. (1975) “The Political Business Cycle”, Review of Economic Studies:169-190  
 
World Bank (2008) “Developing Countries: A Strategy for Macroeconomic Stability” , available  
            online @ 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21675957~pagePK:6425
7043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (2011), www.govindicators.org  
Wright, J (2011) “Electoral Spending Cycles in Dictatorships”, available online @   
                www.personal.psu.edu/jgw12/blogs/josephwright/ESC1.pdf 
Youssef, H. (undated) “Fiscal Manipulation in Non-Democratic regimes: The Case of Egypt,  
             available online @ http://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-  
              repository/public/PU-Fiscal-manipulation-in-non-democratic-regimes-The-  
132 
 















DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
Real Gross Domestic Product (RGDP): 
This is the value of total goods and services produced in the Nigerian economy in a given year and 
adjusted for price changes. It is measured in N’ Million and captures aggregate economic activity in 
Nigeria 
Government Expenditure (GE): 
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This is total federal spending of the Nigerian government in a given year. It comprises federal 
government recurrent (consumption) and capital (investment) expenditure. It is measured in N’ 
Million and used to capture fiscal policy, in this study 
Money Supply Ratio (MS): 
This is broad money supply (M2) as per cent of GDP in a given year. It is measured in ratio and 
represents the monetary policy in this study 
External Debt (ED): 
This is Nigeria’s external debt outstanding. It comprises debt owed multilateral agencies, Paris Club, 
London Club, Promissory notes and others. It capture federal policy or position on external debt 
DUMP: 
This is a dummy used to denote political regime change. In years when there was a change in 
government, dummy variable is denoted as 1 and years when there was no change in government, 
dummy variable is denoted 0. This is used to capture differing personal ideology. 
DUME: 
This is an ethnic-origin dummy. It defines the existence of differences in ideology between a Northern 
and Southern head of government. In years when a Southern head of government is in power, dummy 
takes a value of 1 and for Northern, dummy takes a value of 0 
DUMR: 
It is a political regime type dummy. It captures the existence of differences in ideologies between a 
military and civilian government. In years when a civilian is in power is dummy takes a value of 1 and 




This dummy captures the economic policy leaning of government, as either austere or expansionary. 
This dummy is derived using a modified misery index. In this case, inflation growth rate and fiscal 
balance growth rate are added, and their average found across political regimes. In order to capture 
each political regime appropriately, both variables in annual form, were converted to quarterly data, 
using the quadratic-match interpolation technique. Upon addition of quarterly growth of inflation rates 
and fiscal balance rate, regimes whose average values were negative (positive) were termed 








DATA USED FOR ANALYSIS 
Year   RGDP  GE  MS  ED  DUMP  DUME  DUMR   DUMI  AVDUM 
1960 2489 163.898 11.9839 1 1 1 1 1 
1961 2501.2 167.482 12.1718 49.766 0 1 1 1 0.75 
1962 2597.6 183.514 11.6547 71.582 0 1 1 1 0.75 
1963 2825.6 220.338 11.4577 93.89 0 1 1 1 0.75 
1964 2947.6 236.42 12.5651 101.894 0 1 1 1 0.75 
1965 3146.8 255.144 13.2047 90.366 0 1 1 1 0.75 
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1966 3044.8 258.014 13.5166 104.718 1 0 0 -1 0 
1967 2527.3 349.892 16.4759 131.994 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1968 2543.8 556.194 15.8299 141.228 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1969 3225.5 903.9 15.4512 175.8 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1970 4219 997.2 14.9506 175 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1971 4715.5 1463.6 14.6134 178.5 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1972 4892.8 1529.2 14.6896 265.6 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1973 5310 2740.6 14.6688 276.9 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1974 15919.7 5942.6 9.31683 322.4 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1975 27172 7856.7 14.1155 349.9 1 0 0 1 0.5 
1976 29146.5 8823.8 16.9215 374.6 1 1 0 -1 0.25 
1977 31520.3 8000 19.5017 365.1 0 1 0 -1 0 
1978 29212.3 7406.7 21.4034 1252.1 0 1 0 -1 0 
1979 29948 14968.5 21.8841 1611.5 1 0 1 1 0.75 
1980 31546.8 11413.7 23.8889 1866.8 0 0 1 1 0.5 
1981 205222 11923.2 30.3891 2331.2 0 0 1 1 0.5 
1982 199685 9636.5 32.1724 8819.4 0 0 1 1 0.5 
1983 185598 9927.6 33.306 10577.7 0 0 1 1 0.5 
1984 183563 13041.1 33.722 14808.7 1 0 0 -1 0 
1985 201036 16223.7 32.8372 17300.6 1 0 0 -1 0 
1986 205971 22018.7 34.4287 41452.4 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1987 204807 27749.5 26.2049 100789 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1988 219876 41028.3 27.5779 133956 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1989 236730 60268.2 21.1732 240394 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1990 267550 66584.4 19.7559 298614 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1991 265379 92797.4 24.1562 328454 0 0 0 1 0.25 
1992 271366 191229 20.8617 544264 0 0 0 1 0.25 
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1993 274833 160893 24.1769 633144 1 0 0 1 0.5 
1994 275451 248768 25.592 648813 0 0 0 -1 -0.25 
1995 281407 337218 14.9539 716866 0 0 0 -1 -0.25 
1996 293745 428215 12.7965 617320 0 0 0 -1 -0.25 
1997 302023 487113 14.7496 595932 0 0 0 -1 -0.25 
1998 310890 947690 18.0232 633017 1 0 0 -1 0 
1999 312184 701059 19.69 2,577,374.40 1 1 1 -1 0.5 
2000 329179 701,059.40 19.17 3,097,383.90 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2001 356994 1,018,025.60 26.86 3,176,291.00 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2002 433204 1,018,155.80 21.79 3,932,884.80 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2003 477533 1,225,965.90 23.01 4,478,329.30 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2004 527576 1,426,200.00 18.68 4,890,269.60 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2005 561931 1,822,100.00 18.1 2,695,072.20 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2006 595822 1,938,002.50 20.46 451462 0 1 1 -1 0.25 
2007 634251 2,450,896.70 24.82 431080 1 0 1 -1 0.25 
2008 672203 3,240,820.00 32.96 493180 0 0 1 1 0.5 
2009 718977 3,452,990.80 37.96 590441 0 0 1 1 0.5 























YEAR LNRGDPC LNGEC LNMSC LNEDC 
1960 0.086212 0.267135 0.02494 0
1961 0.062473 0.124354 0.017653 -0.19999
1962 0.070798 0.048685 -0.04885 0.045224
1963 0.123091 0.057887 -0.08967 0.200205
1964 0.128977 -0.05633 -0.02179 0.169263
1965 0.150017 -0.18073 0.003827 -0.06046
1966 0.060029 -0.39056 0.00466 -0.02177
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1967 -0.2022 -0.32996 0.182794 0.100408
1968 -0.29734 -0.13218 0.126702 0.056798
1969 -0.19208 0.070611 0.08941 0.16029
1970 -0.08807 -0.12516 0.044423 0.033103
1971 -0.17354 -0.04144 0.007674 -0.08137
1972 -0.36461 -0.29709 -0.00628 0.165289
1973 -0.5393 -0.00579 -0.0355 0.03571
1974 0.279984 0.493258 -0.52919 -0.00956
1975 0.525511 0.524669 -0.16852 -0.15731
1976 0.305101 0.425033 -0.05469 -0.35681
1977 0.095081 0.143114 0.011024 -0.6927
1978 -0.26639 -0.09056 0.023668 0.186231
1979 -0.52436 0.47772 -0.03431 0.047968
1980 -0.75024 0.087587 -0.02246 -0.22844
1981 0.85705 0.018719 0.15132 -0.45881
1982 0.592034 -0.31099 0.155112 0.39624
1983 0.315412 -0.41315 0.153398 0.090197
1984 0.135742 -0.2952 0.148037 -0.06679
1985 0.090318 -0.25823 0.122385 -0.40452
1986 0.006606 -0.16146 0.188035 -0.01732
1987 -0.08343 -0.16417 -0.05176 0.401746
1988 -0.07807 -0.02902 0.042834 0.244666
1989 -0.05515 0.082888 -0.17145 0.422403
1990 0.027761 -0.10137 -0.18862 0.271022
1991 -0.01111 -0.06006 0.06406 0.036763
1992 -0.01373 0.371298 -0.03224 0.248359
1993 -0.02305 -0.088 0.162919 0.139151
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1994 -0.04263 0.068864 0.263751 -0.06945
1995 -0.04534 0.105174 -0.23602 -0.1823
1996 -0.03092 0.089909 -0.36603 -0.53018
1997 -0.0376 -0.02002 -0.21292 -0.75404
1998 -0.05043 0.422833 -0.01544 -0.87164
1999 -0.09626 -0.08422 0.058906 0.373473
2000 -0.10188 0.09697 0.009701 0.434516
2001 -0.08751 -0.08342 0.318756 0.386481
2002 0.032686 -0.07026 0.077405 0.585561
2003 0.052696 -0.08621 0.095718 0.764647
2004 0.072914 -0.00498 -0.15519 0.964961
2005 0.056107 -0.1046 -0.23802 0.536241
2006 0.035194 -0.0296 -0.17687 -1.04653
2007 0.018899 0.091583 -0.05329 -0.87534
2008 -0.00116 -0.00124 0.155066 -0.52276
2009 -0.01168 0.038426 0.219037 -0.12827






















RESULT OF UNIT ROOT TESTS AT LEVELS 
1. RGDP 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.339            -3.587            -2.933            -2.601
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49
. dfuller lnrgdpc, lag(1)
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Philip Perron Test  
2. Government Expenditure 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Results 
Philip Perron Test Results 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -5.282            -4.159            -3.504            -3.182
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49
. dfuller lnrgdpc, lag(1) trend
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0001
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.716            -3.580            -2.930            -2.600
 Z(rho)          -33.231           -18.900           -13.300           -10.700
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lnrgdpc, lag(1)
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0008
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.671            -4.150            -3.500            -3.180
 Z(rho)          -33.227           -25.700           -19.800           -16.800
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lnrgdpc, lag(1) trend
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0146
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.305            -3.587            -2.933            -2.601
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49








3. Broad Money Supply Ratio 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0006
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.217            -3.580            -2.930            -2.600
 Z(rho)          -25.977           -18.900           -13.300           -10.700
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lngec, lag(1)
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0048
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.177            -4.150            -3.500            -3.180
 Z(rho)          -25.964           -25.700           -19.800           -16.800
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lngec, lag(1) trend
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0004
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.311            -3.587            -2.933            -2.601
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49
. dfuller lnmsc, lag(1)
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Philip Perron Test Results 
 
 
4. External Debt  
 Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0036
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.264            -4.159            -3.504            -3.182
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49
. dfuller lnmsc, lag(1) trend
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0003
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.414            -3.580            -2.930            -2.600
 Z(rho)          -29.697           -18.900           -13.300           -10.700
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lnmsc, lag(1)
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0024
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.371            -4.150            -3.500            -3.180
 Z(rho)          -29.695           -25.700           -19.800           -16.800
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lnmsc, lag(1) trend
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0002
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.536            -3.587            -2.933            -2.601
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49






RESULT OF ARIMA REGRESSION 
1. RGDP 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0016
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -4.487            -4.159            -3.504            -3.182
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit root         Number of obs   =        49
. dfuller lnedc, lag(1) trend
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0015
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.986            -3.580            -2.930            -2.600
 Z(rho)          -26.344           -18.900           -13.300           -10.700
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lnedc, lag(1)
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0104
                                                                              
 Z(t)             -3.947            -4.150            -3.500            -3.180
 Z(rho)          -26.340           -25.700           -19.800           -16.800
                                                                              
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical
                                          Interpolated Dickey-Fuller          
                                                   Newey-West lags =         1
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        50
. pperron lnedc, lag(1) trend
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2. Government Expenditure 
3. Money Supply 
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1871318   .0265644     7.04   0.000     .1350666     .239197
                                                                              
         L4.    -.5974309   .1500746    -3.98   0.000    -.8915718     -.30329
         L3.    -1.002459   .2247308    -4.46   0.000    -1.442923   -.5619947
         L2.    -.4025712   .1500743    -2.68   0.007    -.6967115    -.108431
         L1.     1.002458   .2247297     4.46   0.000     .5619957     1.44292
          ma  
              
         L1.     -.639664   .2970888    -2.15   0.031    -1.221947   -.0573806
          ar  
ARMA          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0435606   .0212233    -2.05   0.040    -.0851574   -.0019637
        dumi     .0099159   .0227571     0.44   0.663    -.0346871    .0545189
        dumr       .17804   .0757678     2.35   0.019     .0295378    .3265422
        dume    -.1683594   .0718703    -2.34   0.019    -.3092226   -.0274962
        dump     .1038856   .0544706     1.91   0.056    -.0028749    .2106461
lnrgdpc       
                                                                              
     lnrgdpc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  10.29609                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =    204.73
Sample:  1960 - 2010                            Number of obs      =        51
ARIMA regression
. 
                                                                              
      /sigma     .1342861   .0129741    10.35   0.000     .1088574    .1597148
                                                                              
         L2.     1.000005   3.40e-06  2.9e+05   0.000     .9999981    1.000011
         L1.    -1.992835    .003265  -610.37   0.000    -1.999234   -1.986436
          ma  
              
         L5.    -.3148601   .1865228    -1.69   0.091     -.680438    .0507178
         L4.     .4381726   .2529245     1.73   0.083    -.0575503    .9338955
         L3.    -.1407018   .2251245    -0.62   0.532    -.5819378    .3005342
         L2.    -.8893972   .3049383    -2.92   0.004    -1.487065   -.2917292
         L1.     1.739283     .22078     7.88   0.000     1.306562    2.172004
          ar  
ARMA          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0509928   .0234879    -2.17   0.030    -.0970283   -.0049573
        dumi     .0222405   .0097322     2.29   0.022     .0031658    .0413152
        dumr     .0397053   .0717797     0.55   0.580    -.1009803    .1803908
        dume     .0939361   .0905296     1.04   0.299    -.0834987    .2713709
        dump     .0617181   .0664534     0.93   0.353    -.0685282    .1919644
lngec         
                                                                              
       lngec        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  24.32874                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(11)      =  5.21e+11









      /sigma     .1176942   .0161812     7.27   0.000     .0859796    .1494088
                                                                              
         L2.     .1364274   .3722825     0.37   0.714    -.5932328    .8660877
         L1.    -1.136427   .3722779    -3.05   0.002    -1.866078   -.4067757
          ma  
              
         L2.    -.6297946   .2232369    -2.82   0.005    -1.067331   -.1922583
         L1.     1.274294   .2102512     6.06   0.000     .8622096    1.686379
          ar  
ARMA          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0081837   .0192479    -0.43   0.671    -.0459089    .0295414
        dumi     .0150371    .011375     1.32   0.186    -.0072575    .0373316
        dumr     .1137695   .0698788     1.63   0.104    -.0231905    .2507294
        dume    -.1196216   .0666692    -1.79   0.073    -.2502909    .0110476
        dump    -.0123912   .0454455    -0.27   0.785    -.1014627    .0766803
lnmsc         
                                                                              
       lnmsc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood =  34.85943                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(7)       =    532.98
Sample:  1960 - 2010                            Number of obs      =        51
ARIMA regression
                                                                              
      /sigma     .2482255    .026854     9.24   0.000     .1955926    .3008584
                                                                              
         L7.    -.7841184   .1060134    -7.40   0.000    -.9919008    -.576336
         L6.    -.6849707   .0944168    -7.25   0.000    -.8700242   -.4999171
         L5.    -.0508028   .0866597    -0.59   0.558    -.2206527    .1190471
         L4.     .0812937   .0739515     1.10   0.272    -.0636486     .226236
         L3.    -.1056575   .0732472    -1.44   0.149    -.2492194    .0379045
         L2.     .1216539   .0883494     1.38   0.169    -.0515078    .2948157
         L1.      .422603    .173215     2.44   0.015     .0831079    .7620982
          ma  
              
         L1.     .0768595   .2582523     0.30   0.766    -.4293056    .5830247
          ar  
ARMA          
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1290465   .0694178    -1.86   0.063    -.2651029    .0070099
        dumi     .0508202   .0429109     1.18   0.236    -.0332837    .1349241
        dumr     .0715057   .2132869     0.34   0.737    -.3465288    .4895403
        dume     .2103041   .2093187     1.00   0.315     -.199953    .6205612
        dump     .1626149   .0746354     2.18   0.029     .0163322    .3088977
lnedc         
                                                                              
       lnedc        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                           Semirobust
                                                                              
Log pseudolikelihood = -7.020137                Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(10)      =  5.49e+08















                                                                              
var(e.lnedc)      .149015   .0319476     4.66   0.000      .086399    .2116311
var(e.lnmsc)     .0167687   .0047138     3.56   0.000     .0075298    .0260077
var(e.lngec)     .0157381   .0104597     1.50   0.132    -.0047626    .0362388
var(e.lnrg~c)    .0656165   .0203884     3.22   0.001      .025656    .1055771
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0022689   .0634679    -0.04   0.971    -.1266636    .1221258
       AVDUM     .0995619    .043284     2.30   0.021     .0147268    .1843969
lnedc         
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0014959   .0319981    -0.05   0.963    -.0642111    .0612192
       AVDUM     .0656446   .0231282     2.84   0.005      .020314    .1109751
lnmsc         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0030305   .0538773     0.06   0.955     -.102567     .108628
       AVDUM    -.1329819   .0372713    -3.57   0.000    -.2060322   -.0599315
lngec         
                                                                              
       _cons     .0000383   .0363856     0.00   0.999    -.0712761    .0713527
       AVDUM    -.0016813    .041946    -0.04   0.968    -.0838939    .0805313
lnrgdpc       
                                                                              
         L1.     .6532151   .1128032     5.79   0.000     .4321249    .8743052
       AVDUM  
AVDUM         
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
Log likelihood =  13.035468                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  Wald chi2(5)    =     128.72























































































                                                              
       factd     .0023248   .0872122     -.1729346    .1775842
                                                              
                     Mean   Std. Err.     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                              
Mean estimation                     Number of obs    =      50
23      -0.0046   0.2487   22.305  0.5019                                      
22      -0.0850  -0.6102   22.302  0.4420                                      
21       0.1758   0.3859   21.632  0.4210                                      
20      -0.1646  -0.4401   18.861  0.5309                                      
19       0.1189   0.2526   16.514  0.6228                                      
18       0.0664  -0.1003   15.328  0.6394                                      
17       0.0542  -0.1538   14.969  0.5977                                      
16       0.0870  -0.2257   14.738  0.5439                                      
15       0.0967  -0.0480   14.159  0.5135                                      
14      -0.0718  -0.2897   13.464  0.4904                                      
13      -0.0067  -0.0308   13.092  0.4408                                      
12      -0.0789  -0.2594   13.089  0.3626                                      
11       0.0812  -0.1849   12.662  0.3160                                      
10       0.0203  -0.1029   12.223  0.2704                                      
9       -0.1531  -0.1553   12.196  0.2025                                      
8       -0.1106  -0.1747    10.71  0.2187                                      
7       -0.3018  -0.3404   9.9535  0.1912                                      
6        0.1583   0.1469   4.4462  0.6165                                      
5        0.0952   0.0660   2.9656  0.7053                                      
4       -0.1210  -0.1514   2.4417  0.6551                                      
3       -0.1545  -0.1627   1.6135  0.6563                                      
2       -0.0439  -0.0478   .29319  0.8636                                      
1       -0.0597  -0.0596   .18899  0.6638                                      
                                                                               
 LAG       AC       PAC      Q     Prob>Q  [Autocorrelation]  [Partial Autocor]
                                          -1       0       1 -1       0       1
. corrgram factd
. 
       lnedc     0.1225  -0.0813  -0.2596   0.1204   1.0000
       lnmsc     0.3641  -0.0261  -0.4454   1.0000
       lngec    -0.2365   0.0192   1.0000
     lnrgdpc    -0.0124   1.0000
       factd     1.0000
                                                           
                  factd  lnrgdpc    lngec    lnmsc    lnedc
(obs=50)
. correlate factd lnrgdpc lngec lnmsc lnedc
